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• 
TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE APPLY TO A 
COMPANY OR A PARTNERSHIP? 
I INTRODUCTION: 
1. What are the rules of natural justice? 
The English common law recognises that there are two 
principles of natural justice: that no man should be condemned 
without first having been given adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard (~ ~teram ~), and that every 
adjudicator be disinterested and free from bias (~ jude~ ~ 
~ ~). Both of these principles are regarded as being the 
minimum requirement necessary for justice not merely in the 
administration of justice in the courts in the strict sense, but 
also in the determination of the much wider range of matters 
which are dealt with by administrative and domestic tribunals. 
However the phrase natural justice may be used to refer to 
principles other than the two fundamental principles just 
mentioned. In its widest sense it was at one time used as a 
synonym for natural law,< 1 ) and recently the American Supreme 
Court in the case of Brown v Walker ( 2 ) has described the 
privilege against self incrimination as a part of natural 
justice. The Franks Committee()) suggested that natural justice 
requires the giving of reasons for decisions, and the case of 
Rv Deputy Injuries Commissioner, ex parte Moore ( 4 ) further 
suggests that a body when making a decision must act only on 
evidence of probative value. Again the maxim of criminal law, 
1 • 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
See HH Marshall "Natural Justice" Chpt. 2 
191 US 591, 600 (1896) quoted by Heydon (1971)87 L.Q.R. 214, 
216 
(J) 
(4) 
Cmnd 218 paragraph 98, and see Akehurst (1970) 33 MLR 154 
1965 1QB 456, 476, 487 LAW LIBRARY 
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~ ~ ~ ~ nitj ~ ~ ~, was described by 
Lord Kenyon in the early case of~F-owler v Padget(l} as a 
principle of natural justice, while in the more recent case of 
Liyange. V R s~>the, ~)'ivy .Council denied that retrospective 
registration was contrary to the rules of natural justice. 
While the common law readily recognised the right to 
a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, the willingness 
of the courts to interfere with the decisions of domestic 
and administrative tribunals on the grounds of a breach of 
these principles has varied from generation to generation.(
3 ) 
Throughout the nineteenth century the courts freely 
imputed an obligation to observe the rules of natural justice, 
however, by the 1950's it was possible for one writer (
4 ) 
to entitle an article "The twilight of natural justice". 
But Wade's optimism proved ephemeral and the courts since the 
House of Lord decision in Ridge v Baldwin(
5 ) have been 
extending the scope of the rules of natural justice so that 
judges once again insist that t~ content of the rules are 
flexible, which means that in all circumstances the official 
must act fairly. The position is such that it has spurred 
one judge to warn: 
"The principles of natural justice are of wide 
application and great importance but they must 
be confined within proper limits and not allowed 
to run wild" (6) 
(1798) F.T.R. 509, 514 
[1 9 6 7.J 1 A • C • 2 5 9 , 2 8 3 
See de Smith "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 
2. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(3rd Edition) P• 136 et seq; Hewitt "Natural Justice" p.324. 
H.W.R. Wade (1951) 67 L.Q.R. 103 
L1964] AC 40 
Per Megarry J. in Hounslow L.B.C. v. Twickenham Garden 
Developments Limited C1971J Ch 233, 258. 
And again in Gaiman v National Associatio
n for Mental 
Health(l) the judge summed up the presen
t tendency of the 
courts when he stated: 
"It may be that there is no simple test, 
but that 
there is a tendency for the court to app
ly the 
principles to all powers of decision unl
ess the 
circumstances suffice to exclude them." 
As Lord Reid pointed out in Ridge v Bald
win( 2 ) the 
courts from the 1920's onwards tended to 
define the duty 
to observe the rules of natural justice i
n terms of a narrow 
definition of the duty to act judicially
. Whether a body 
was acting judicially or not was a questi
on which was 
commonly answered by invoking the dictum 
of Atkins L.J. in 
R v Electricity Commissioners(
3 ) who stated: 
"Wherever any body of persons having lega
l authority 
to determine questions affecting the righ
ts of 
subjects and having the duty to act judi
cially ••• " 
This dictum, as Lord Reid pointed out, w
as interpreted 
to mean that a duty to act judicially was not 
to be inferred 
from the nature of the power conferred on
 a body alone: 
there had also to be a superadded duty to ac
t judicially. 
But one may wonder whether the restrictiv
e interpretation 
was not evidence of the courts attitude r
ather than the cause. 
The general reluctance of the courts to i
nvalidate a 
decision on the grounds that there had be
en a breach of 
the rules of natural justice is evidenced
 by the numerous 
distinctions that grew up. In R v Metro
politan Police 
Commissioner ex parte Parker(
4 )a distinction was made 
between judicial and disciplinary powers.
 If the function 
(1) Per Megarry J. [1971J Ch 317, 333 
(2) Supra 
(3) [1924) 1 KB 171,205 
( 4 ) r1 9 5 3 J 1 W • L • R • 11 5 O 
3. 
of the deciding body was merely disciplinary, the rules 
of natural justice did not apply. Again in Nakk.uda Ali v 
Jayaratne (
1 )the Privy Council drew a distinction between 
a right and a privilege, and again if the decision merely 
affected a privilege there was no right to be h~ard. 
Furthermore the decision of Maugham J. in MacLean v The 
Workers Union(
2 ) clearly expressed a reluctance to interfere 
with the decisions of domestic tribunals. But at no time 
did the courts attempt a satisfactory definition of the 
term "acting judicially", even in the narrowest sense. ( 
3 ) 
In fact in R v Manchester Legal Aid Committee, ex parte Brand(
4 ) 
Parker J, (as he then was) summarised the case law when he said: 
"The duty to act judicially may arise in widely 
different circumstances which it would be 
impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt 
to define exhaustively". 
The phrase was even further relegated to the realms of 
uncertainty by the courts' attempted definitions of a 
"quasi-judicial" function.(
5 ) 
The decision of Ridge v Baldwin(
6 ) has not removed all 
the uncertainty from this area of the law, and cases such 
as R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex parte Benaim(
7 ) 
show that the destinction between rights and privileges · 
has survived this case. 
The significance of Ridge v Baldwin is not that it 
removed the uncertainty from this area of the law but that 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
f~l 
Cl 9511 AC 66 
C1929J 1 Ch 602 
See De Smith supra p. 64 et seq. 
[1952] 2 QB 413, 428 
See Wade "Administrative Law" (3rd Edition) p. 190 
Supra 
[1 970J 2 QB 41 7 
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(,t 
it clearly indicated and inaugurated a complete 
reversal in judicial attitudes, the litigation itself in 
its passage through the courts showing the restrictive 
and liberal approaches adopted by the various judges. 
In this case a chief constable (Ridge) was dismissed without 
a hearing by his watch committee after his conduct had been 
criticised by a judge in the course of a trial for 
conspiracy to prevent the course of justice. The trial led 
to the conviction of a number of members of his force, but 
Ridge himself was acquitted. In considering Ridge's 
claim that the committee's decision was void, the courts 
were faced with two questions. Firstly, should an 
obligation to give a hearing be read into the statutory 
provisions which empowered the committee to dismiss the 
constable when no reference was made in the statute to a 
hearing; secondly, had later statutory provisions provided 
a right to a hearing irrespective of the meaning of the 
Act in question. Only the first question is relevant in 
the present discussion. At first instance Streatfield ·J. 
held that a right to a hearing ought to be read into the 
statute: 
"It is not merely an administrative matter, as 
a result of which some person may be prejudiced 
or may be deprived of the right of property, and 
so on; what the committee were doing here was to 
take a very serious step under an Act of 
Parliament which, of itself, gave no right of 
appeal - they were exercising the right to dismiss 
a man, to deprive him of l:is accumulated pension 
rights". 
However the learned Judge held, natural justice had 
been complied with since the committee was entitled to 
reach its decision on the evidence which the chief constable 
himself had given in the course of the trial. Out of the 
plaintiff's own testimony he had convicted himself. The 
5 • 
Court of Appeal went even further than Streatfield J., 
and held that the watch committee was not under a duty to 
even give Ridge a hearing. 
However ·, the House of · tords, Beld · that the 
committee was under an obligation to observe the rules of 
natural justice and that on the facts, Ridge had not had 
a proper hearing. Lord Reid regarded the facts of the 
case as falling within the category of dismissal from an 
office where there must be a good cause for dismissing 
a person. Lord Reid's judgment did not, however, attempt 
to lay down any general principle. He revived natural justice 
by rescuing from oblivion old authorities but said nothing 
about new fact situations which did not fall squarely 
within established categories. Lord Morris similarly, 
founded himself on cases involving property rights and 
provided no general guide for the future. Lord Hodson 
also referred to old cases and concluded that: 
" ••••• where the power to be exercised involves a 
charge of misconduct made against the person 
who is dismissed ••• the principles of natural 
justice have to be observed". 
Cases decided after Ridge's case while extending the 
scope of natural justice have made no attempt to define 
"judicial" or "quasi-judicial" functions Resort instead has 
been had to the idea of acting fairly. The concept of 
fairness was not unknown before Ridge's case, but it seems 
to have steadily gained popularity since Lord Parker C.J. 
(as he then was) in Re H.K. (an Infant)( 1) said: 
"It is not as I see it, a question of acting 
or being required to act judicially, but of 
being required to act fairly". 
( 1 ) [1 929] 1 Ch 602 
6. 
This new approach will be more fully discussed in this 
text in the context of when the rules apply, however, 
it is first necessary to examine in more detail the two 
limbs of the rules of natural justice. 
(~) Audi Alteram partem rule 
"Laws of God and Man both give man right to make 
his defence". 
7. 
Is a dictum of Fortesque J. in R v University of Cambridge(
1 ) 
reveals that the Courts took a firm stand on the principle 
that those who decided anything could not validly do so 
without giving the person or persons affected the 
opportunity of being heard. But what constitutes an 
adequate opportunity to be heard, will ultimately depend 
upon the particular circumstances in each case. However, 
a right to have a fair hearing and defend the allegations 
made against oneself would be illusory without sufficient 
notice of the allegations and sufficient time to prepare 
a defence. These two requirements will of course vary with 
the facts of the particular case. Elaborate statutory 
procedures must be followed when an application or appeal 
is made to the courts. The mere fact that a person cannot 
be found and cannot, therefore, have actual notice served on 
him does not prevent a decision being made in his absence. 
The New Zealand and all other Commonwealth courts as well 
as the courts of most developed legal systems have elaborate 
provisions relating to the serving of notice on parties that 
cannot be found·. <2 ) A decision that has been given 
in absentia of a party has never been regarded as a breach 
(1) (1723) 1 Str 557 
(2) See 
8. 
of natural justice. However the cases of Rudd v Rudd (l) 
and Macalpine Y Macalpine( 2 ) clearly indicate that the position 
is different if the rules as to substituted service 
have been invoked as a result of the fraud of one of the 
parties.()) 
Usually a party claiming that he has been denied 
natural justice under the audi alteram partem rule will 
rely on the inadequacy of the notice he has received. 
In New Zealand Dairy Board v Okitu Co-operative Dairy 
Company Limited(
4 ) a zoning order prejudicial to a dairy 
company bas been roo.de by a dairy board without giving the 
company a reasonable opportunity of being heard and without 
disclosing to the company a certain letter from a competitor. 
The Court of Appeal (by a majority of three to two) held that ,. 
the dairy board had violated the audi alteram partem rule which 
it was obliged to observe. 
(5) 
The question of inadequacy of the notice may also arise if the 
notice is vague or ambiguous, for example in Urban Housing Co~ 
Oxford City Council(
6 ) it was held that insufficient notice had 
been given because the demolishing of the walls was not 
a task which was normally in the hands of the town clerk, 
but the sort of thing which the city engineer would be 
responsible for, therefore the letter giving notice would 
lead to the recipient presuming that proceedings normally 
left to a town clerk would be taken. (
7 ) 
(1) C1924JP.72 
(2) C1958JP.35 
(3) For a further discussion see Dicey & Morris, "The conflict 
of Laws" (8th Edition) pp 318-319, & Marshall supra Chpt. 5 
( 4) '[195 3JNZLR 366 
(5) See also Sheldon v Bromfield Justices ~964J 2QB 573; 
Marands v Mosque v Badi-Ud-Din Mahmud [ 19673 AC 13 C1940J 
( 6) z::1940] Ch 70 
(7) See also Sloan v Genera 1 Medica 1 Counc i 1 [j 970J 1 WLR 11 )0 
C1 f)'.3'jj U'lI1R 504 
Or the party will rely on the inadequacy length of time 
allowed to him to prepare his defence. 
In Boys v Carlyan(l) only two hours notice was given and 
this was held to be manifestly inadequate. But occasionally 
situations do arise where the party involved is completely 
unaware of the proceedings against him.( 2 ) 
Natural justice does not require that the hearing should 
be oral. This proposition was settled by the House of Lords 
in Local Government Board v Arlidge ( 3 ) where it was 
held that a householder whose property had been condemned 
as unfit for human habitation had no right to insist on an 
oral hearing at the appeal to the Local Government Board 
9. 
against the local authority's decision. In certain situations 
the right to an oral ~earing may resolve itself into a question 
of statutory interpretation,( 4 ) or the empowering statute may 
give a tribunal a discretion whether to hold an oral hearing 
or not.( 5 ) The general principle suggested by thecases 
and text writers is that there is no right to an oral hearing 
unless the refusal of an oral hearing would prejudice the 
applicant and even then the express words of the statute may 
take away that right. Normally written submissions in a case 
are sufficient if the truthfulness of the applicant is not 
an issue. But there are situations where the applicant 
does not wish to bring new facts to the tribunal's attention 
but to convince them that his version of a disputed story 
is true. In Rose v Humbles( 6 ) Rose, 
( 1) [I 939]NZLR 504 
(2
3
) See Flei t Mortgage v Lower Maisonette D 9721 2 ALL ER 737 
( ) I} 91 5] AC 120 
( 4) See Wiseman v Borneman O 971 ]AC 297 
( 5) See R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner D 965] 1 QB 
456 
(6) [l97o] 1 W".L.R. 1061. 
a taxpayer was assessed for taxation purposes. He appealed 
to the general commissioners against his assessment and a 
date was fixed for a hearing. However, the hearing was 
adjourned to a later date owing to the taxpayers' illness. 
At the date of the adjourned hearing, Rose was still 
unwell, the commissioners refused to grant an adjournment 
1 0. 
and determine Rose's appeal. The Chancery Division (per Buckley 
held that the refusal of the Inland Revenue Commissioners to postpon 
the hearing was a substantial injustice because the whole 
outcome of the applicant's case depended on whether he was 
believed that the increase in his income was made from 
winnings from bets. Similarly, perhaps, a university committee 
deciding whether to exclude an unsuccessful student from a 
course _might well satisfy the rules ofnatural justice 
by allowing only written submissions relating to the 
causes of his examination failure in the form of such evidence 
as medical certificates. But such a committee deciding 
whether to expel a student for alleged dishonesty'would surelj' 
or 'might'be required to allow the student to appear personally. 
The adequacy of the notice and time may be of 
very little help if the party to be proceeded against 
does not know the evidence against him. In R v Architects' 
Registration Tribunal, Ex parte Jagger(
1 ) it was held that 
it was improper for the tribunal, which acted in a 
quasi-judicial capacity, to consider and give weight to 
evidence contained in documents, the contents and 
(1) L1945J 2 All ER 131 
:)l_. source of wh.ich were . . not ,divulged to "'the applicant.. It 
was not sufficient that the applicant was merely asked to 
explain certain information contained in such documents. 
Since the applicant was, therefore, not given a real and 
effective opportunity of meeting relevant allegations ma.de 
. aga-inst -him, .-the. motion. to- quash the ,decision of the 
tribunal succeeded. 
In Fenton v Auckland City( 1 ) a company proposed to build 
a fourteen storey block of flats which required the· ·city 
council's permission. Objections to the proposed project 
were heard by the Town Planning Committee, but unknown to 
the objecting parties, the committee had a lengthy report 
from the city engineer summarizer, the proposals and 
objections and a planning officer's comments on the validity 
of the objections. Some of the comments were factual but 
some were in the nature of opinions. The committee approved 
the application. The Court held that the approval should be 
set aside on the ground of a breach of natural justice. 
Because of the non-disclosure of the reports, the parties had 
not been given an opportunity to contradict the statements. 
Speight J. noted that such reports might have greatly influenced 
the committee. 
Although a person must be given sufficient details of the 
evidence against him and an opportunity to answer it, the Court 
of Appeal in R v Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex pa.rte Benaim 
and Khaids( 2 ) held that the person does not need to know the 
source of the evidence if the material can be fairly answered in 
ignorance of source. The New Zealand Supreme Court in Perpetual 
Trustee v Dunedin City()) 
(1) f1969J NZLR 256 Also see Kanda v Government of Malaya 
11 • 
(1962] A.C. 322; 
(2) R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex pa.rte Jones 
[1962] QB 677; Shareef v Comm. for~n. of Indian & Parkistani 
Residents [1966J A.C. 47 
I.1970] 2 QB 417 
(3) [1968] M.L.R. 19 
held that where a party is only entitled to be heard on one 
issue but not another, he is only entitled to know of the 
material he will be heard on. 
There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule 
that theevidence be disclosed, and in some circumstances 
communication of the evidence to the person seeking a 
hearing may be undesirable, for example, medical evidence 
in cases involving mental illness. In re K (an Infant(
1 ) 
which involved proceedings for custody of a child, the 
judge took into account a confidential report on the 
child submitted by the official solicitor as guardian 
ad litem, without disclosing it. The House of Lords held 
that the wardship proceedings allowed non disclosure if it 
was in the child's interest not to disclose it.(
2 ) 
Where there is a duty to disclose material it 
need not be necessary to disclose all its details but only 
such detail as is sufficient to outline the substance 
of the allegation or evidence, the general test being 
whether there is sufficient disclosure to give the party 
a fair opportunity to answer it. In Maxwell v Department 
v Department of Trade(
3 ) the court held that a company 
inspector investigating Maxwell's affairs only had to 
disclose the substance of the investigation. The 
investigation was not in the nature of a trial, and 
therefore he did not have to reveal the same detail as 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
[196 5] A. C. 201 
See als O Re p .A. An Infant [1971J 3 ALL ER 5
22; Re 
M (an Infant [1972] 3 ALL E.R. 321 
09741 2 W.L.R. 338 
1 2. 
he would if Maxwell was on trial or in some other analogous 
si tu.a ti on. 
The New Zealand court has also ma.de a distinction 
between material acquired outside the tribunal and material 
acquired by the tribunal itself. In South Otago Hospital Board 
v Nurses and Midwives Board( 1 ) the plaintiff hospital, board 
wanted a decision of the defendant board, to cancel 
approval of Balclutha Hospital as a Grade A training hospital 
for nurses, quashed. The decision was first proposed after 
the defendant board had received two reports from inspectors 
recommending this action because of the insufficient clinical 
material available in the hospital. At its request the 
plaintiff board was given a full hearing and both reports were 
disclosed to them prior to the hearing. But at the hearing 
the plaintiff argued that the situation had improved. 
Therefore, the defendant board sent one of its members to 
hospital to see the hospital. The report of the tribunal 
member reaffirmed the original recommendation, thus the 
defendant board decided to cancel the approval without 
further consultation with the plaintiffs and without telling 
the plaintiffs what the last report said. 
However, the court held that the visit to the 
hospital by the tribunal member, was in the nature of 
an extended hearing therefore it was not a case of 
receiving information behind the parties back, and no 
new or unrevealed issues were raised. 
( 1 ) [J 972:J N. Z. L .R. 828 
1 J. 
But in this case there had been another report given to 
the defendant board before the hearing. This report 
had accidentally not _been disclosed. Even though the 
substance of this report was the same as the two 
earlier ones Wild C.J. still held its non-disclosure 
was a breach of natural justice, therefore, the decision was 
quashed for that reason. 
Similarly if a party takes a point of law before 
a tribunal then the tribunal can get a~ opinion on this 
point and need not disclose the opinion or give the parties 
a further opportunity to argue the point. In Wislang v 
Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee( 1 ) Speight J. 
1 4. 
held that there had been no breach of the audi alteram partem rule 
by the divisional committee getting a legal opinion. 
If there exists a right to an oral hearing there is 
possibly also a right to cross-examine witnesses. Some 
support for this view can be got from Osgood v Nelson( 2 ) 
where Martin B speaking on behalf of the judges called to 
the House of Lords advised that the corporation of the 
City of London, in removing Osgood from his office, had 
observed the rules of natural justice since their 
procedure reached the standard followed in the ordinary courts. 
Among the elements of that procedure quoted by His 
Lordship was the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 
However in the University of Ceylon v Fernando()) Fernando 
was excluded from the University after he had been found 
guilty by the Committee of the University of offences in 
( 1 ) [197 4] 1 NZLR 29 
(2) [1872] LR 5 H.L. 636 
(3) d960J 1 W.L.R. 223 
connection with exams. The committee had given 
Fernando a full hearing in respect of the charges but 
the student who ha.d made the original allegations had 
been questioned in his absence and Fernando had been 
given no opportunity of examining him nor had he 
asked for one. The Privy Council held that the Committee 
had satisfied the rules of natural justice although 
Fernando had not cross-examined the witness. But ·the 
Privy Council indicated that the decision may well have 
been different if he had requested to c ross-examine and 
had been refused. 
This decision has been criticised by de Smith(l) 
not for denying the right to cross-examine, but for 
expecting Fernando, who was not legally represented, to take 
the initiative in making the request. Support for de Smith's 
view may be found in Hoggard v Wornborough U D.C~
2 ) 
In this case a local authority was empowered by statute 
to make certain payments to a person ~ther than the owner 
of property if it appeared "to them to be equitable 
in the circumstances". Hoggard took no steps after he 
was informed by the council that money was available 
for these payments to Hoggard's tenant. Winn J. held that 
this decision was a breach of natural justice because the 
council had to decide equitably between the competing 
claims, and, therefore each claim must receive consideration 
and each claimant must be invited. 
(1) de Smith (supra) p. 188 r. 75 
(2) [1962.J2 QB 93 
1 5 . 
"Not merely left to take the initiative 
if he chooses to put forward the material ••• 
which he desires to have considered" (1) 
1 6. 
Another argument against the decision in Fernando's case 
is that it was a case where natural justice would 
require an opportunity to cross-examine because the 
case resolved itself into a matter of one party's 
woru againat the other~~ In addition, there is a general 
rule that a party is entitled to be present when the 
tribun~l receives ~r gathers -evidence.(
2 ) 
The right to have a fair hearing may include a 
right to legal representation. In two recent English cases 
Pett v Greyhound Racing Association No. 1 Ltd{J) 
and Enderby Town Football Club Limited v Football Association 
Limited( 4 ) the courts seem to have moved from a position 
that there is always a right to legal representation to the 
proposition that the existence of such a right depends 
on the circumstances of each case. In Pett v Greyhound 
Racing Association No. 1 the National Greyhound Racing 
Association Limited issued licenses to persons concerned 
in greyhound racing, including proprietors of race-courses 
and trainers of greyhounds. A holder of their licence 
agreed to be bound by their Rules of Rac±ng. The 
rules provided for the holding of inquiries and gave 
power to withdraw or suspend licenses. However, the 
rules did not provide for the procedure to be adopted 
at an inquiry or deal with the rights of license holders 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
ibid p. 100 
See In re Royal Commission (1962] NZLR 96, 111 , 117 per 
North and Cleary JJ. 
[1 969] 1 QB 125 
[1971] Ch 591 
to be legally represented. The defendant owned 
and operated a racecourse llcensed by the Club and 
the plaintiff held a club trainer's licence. Pursuant 
to the Rules of Racing, the defendants intended to hold 
an inquiry into the alleged drugging of a greyhound 
1 7. 
trained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's solicitor wrote 
the defendants asking for the hearing to be adjourned 
soethat the , plaintiff .. _could give-- inatructions_ for the 
plaintiff to be legally represented. The defendants replied 
agreeing- to--a-d;rourn the hearing. At the- adjourned 
hearing the plaintiff attended with his counsel and 
solicitor. The defendants then adjourned the hearing so 
that they could consider whether they would permit him 
to be legally represented at the hearing. They later 
informed the plaintiff that they intended to hold the 
inquiry at a later date but they would not permit him to 
be so represented. The Court of Appeal issued an 
interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from 
holding an inquiry into the running of Petts Greyhounds 
unless he was allowed to appear and be legally 
represented. Emphasis was made in the judgments of the 
gravity of the charge and its consequences. Lord Denning 
said that there may not be such a right in minor matters, 
although even there it seems it is a question of giving 
up such a right by contract. The other members of the 
Court of Appeal impliedly accepted this view. However 
at the trial - Pett v Gre~hound Racing Association No. 2 (l) 
(1) I'1970J lQB 46 
Lyell J. despite the views of the Court of Appeal 
held that there was no rule of natural justice requiring 
a right to le~ga-1~ representa.tion • .. His Honour was of. _the 
opinion that in the absence of express requirements 
in the instruments conferring quasi-judicial powers 
on a domestic tribunal, the tribunal was only to comply 
with those elementary and essential principles of "fairness" 
and accordingly he held that legal representation was not 
an elementary principle in natural justice. The Learned 
Judge relied on the decision of the Privy Council in 
Fernando's case which had not been cited in the Court 
of Appeal. Lyell J. regarded that case as conflicting 
with the views of the Privy Council and says (j)after 
quoting the board's reference to "elementary and 
essential principles of fairness": 
"I find it diffic'ult- tu--say--tha·t "lErgal -representation 
before a tribunal is an elementary feature 
of the fair dispensation of justice. It seems 
to me that it arises only in a society which has 
reached some degree of sophistication in its 
affairs". 
However, it is arguable that when the Privy Council 
. --- in- -Fernando '-s... case referred to elementary principles it 
was not contra.sting primitive and sophisticated societies 
as the learned Judge suggests but basic principles 
common to all courts and tribunals a.s opposed to the 
highly technical rules of evidence peculiar to common 
law courts. In the second case Enderby Town Football Club 
Limited v The Football Association Limited, the Court 
of Appeal emphasised that everything depends on the 
facts of the particular case. 
(1) Ibid p. 65 
1 8. 
The Football Association, a United company!
1 ) had a 
rule prohibiting a club which appealed to it from 
decisions of the various county associations, from being 
legally represented. The Enderby Town Football Club, 
also a limited company, having appealed to the Football 
Association from , a decision of a county association, 
sought an injunction to prevent the appeal being heard 
,, unless, ,.the. cluh ~was a.llowed , le.gal,..repres.e.ntation. The
 
Court of Appeal held that since the club could, if it 
wished, ha ve- -·sought ·a- ~dec lars-ti on of - its 1 egal-- - rights 
from the courts it could not complain of the offending 
rule if it chose to submit to the appellate jurisdiction 
of the Football Association. All the members of the Cou
rt 
of Appeal discussed the right to legal representation. 
Both Fenton/ Atkinson and Cairns L.J.J. were prepared 
to recognise that clubs might exclude the right to legal 
representation by an absolute rule. Fenton, Atkinson L~d. 
gave examples of statutory exclusions of the right and 
referred to the paucity of case law on the subject. 
He concluded (
2 ) 
"If such a rule is indeed contrary to natural 
···-justice, - & . ve~y.. - larga- number.. of persons, 
including our legislators, must have been very 
insensitive over a long period of years to 
what natural justice requires". (3) 
Lord Denning relenting from what seemed to be the 
absolute rule he had propounded in Pett's Case admitted 
that it might be a good thing for the proceedings of a 
domestic tribunal to be conducted informally without lega
l 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
A point which is further discussed post p. 
f1971J Ch 591 , 609 
See further Gaiman v National Association for Mental 
Heal tb [1971) Ch 317. where Megarry J. held that the 
wholly unrestricted expulsion powers in the articles 
excluded the principles of natural justice. 
'w- 1 9. 
. 
'1 
. . , M \'II\"\ • c' v.-· g;--<. 
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"Justice can often be done in them better by 
a good layman than by a bad lawyer" (1) 
And further on in his judgment Lord Denning said 
that the right- t-o representation depends on the 
discretion of the tribunal which must be genuinely 
exercised. In Pett's case the court had intervened because 
the Greyhound Racing Association had an inflexible practice 
of refusing representation. A rule, therefore, . which 
purported expressly to exclude a right to representation 
would be void. 
"If they lay down a procedure which is contrary 
to the princi~les of natural justice they 
are invalid. {2) 
Unless, of course, it could be construed as directory 
and not imperative, so that the tribunal could allow legal 
counsel to be present in appropriate cases where fairness 
demanded it". 
Finally it is necessary to consider problems which 
may arise in large organisations such as government 
departmen~ regulatory bodies or universities. Does the 
right to a hearing involve the right that he who hears 
also decides? This question may arise,for example, in 
connection with a University Council which wishes 
to delegate the collecting of evidence and the making of 
decisions, or at any rate recommendations, to a small 
disciplinary committee. In this situation is it necessary 
to distinguish the making of the decision which cannot 
be delegated, from the collecting of evidence. So far as 
the making of the decision is concerned there is no need 
to invoke any maxim such as that judicial powers cannot 
be delegated for that simply re-introduces the 
(1) ibid 605 
(2) ibid 606 
20. 
unsatisfactory concepts which have been abandoned 
by the courts in other areas of the law.(l) Moreover, 
any rule against delegation of decision-making is 
a strong presumption rather than an absolute prohibition, 
or at least this was the view of Paull J. in In re S 
(a Barrister)(
2 ) 
" ••• assuming that (counsel) is correct in 
his contentions that . a judicial or quasi-
judicial duty cannot as a matter of general 
principle be delegated the question to be 
determined would be whether, in the 
interests of justice, delegation in this 
particular case can and should be allowed". 
In many cases the solution will be found in the 
construction of the statutory provisions or the 
contractual terms()} In other cases the solution may be 
a finding of fact, that is, whether or not delegation 
is possible, it has not on the facts before the court, 
-- - oeeurred.- ·A · le.rge-----body which delegates to a 
committee the power to conduct a hearing and receive 
evidence 4s not delegating its powers provided the 
evidence collected is laid before the body making the 
final decision. However if the appointed committee does 
not transmit to the parent body the evidence it has 
received, then a question of the validity of the 
delegation will occur. 
In Jeffs v New Zealand Dairy Production Marketing 
BoarJ4 )the Privy Council held that the New Zealand Dairy 
Production and Marketing Board was empowered by 
legislation to determine zoning questions, even if its 
21 • 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
See Richmond J, in Turner v Allison [1971]NZLR 833,855-857 
[1970J 1 QB 160, 172 
See for example Barnard v NDLB D953]2QB 18 and Vine v 
(4) 
N.D.L.B. 1957 AC 488 
C1 9611 N • Z • L • R. 1 0 5 7 
pecuniary interests might be effected. Nevertheless, 
while the Board itself has authority to hear and receive 
oral or written evidence on questions of zoning and could 
.delegate that .authority to .a..- person or persons acting . for 
it, the Board must act judicially, that is to say, the 
Board was under a duty itself to consider all the 
evidence so offered. As the board failed to do so, it 
had failed to hear the interested parties before deciding 
the issues involved. The appeal from the judgment of the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal was affirmed. 
· - In deciding whe~her or not a delegation is 
permitted by natural justice, the courts are willing to 
~ ~ 22 . 
pay close regard to the practical realities of the situation 
before them. ( 1 ) 
(ii:} Nemo iudex in re sua 
::::::=5 ::::_;:: 
The requirement of impartiality by the adjudicator 
issometimes expressed in the form nemo iudex in~ su~ or 
no man should be a judge in his own cause. This form of 
expressing the rule is of particular interest since the 
Court of Appeal decision in Hannam v Bradford Corporation~
2
) 
The facts of this case can be briefly stated as follows; 
Hannam, a school-master, had been dismissed by the school 
governors. This decision was confirmed by the staff 
sub-committee of the local education committee. The 
Chairman of the sub-committee was a governor of Hannam's 
school and two other governors were also members of the 
(1) See Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney (1963) S.R.(NSW) 
723, 733 
( 2 ) ':19 7 0 J 1 W • L. R. 9 3 9 
"-
sub-committee although none of the three had attended 
the governors meeting at which the decision to dismiss 
Hannam had been taken. Although the courts held that 
Hannam was not entitled to the remedy he sought all three 
judges, agreed that the decision of the sub-committee could 
have been successfully attacked for bias if the appropriate 
procedure had been used. While Widgery and Cross L.J.J. 
merely spoke in general terms of bias, Sachs L.J. 
( 1 ) 
distinguished between "bias" and 
"· •• a slightly different ground on which it was 
abundantly clear - that - the ~staff sub-committee 
decision could not stand. No man can be a judge 
of his own cause. The governors did not, on 
donning their sub-committee hats, cease to be an 
integral part of the body whose action was being 
impugned and it made no difference that they did 
not personally attend the relevant governors' 
meeting". 
However, leaving aside for the moment the applicability 
of Sach's LJ's "slightly different ground" it is still 
believed to be of fundamental importance that judges and 
other adjudicators are free from partiality, or at least 
from those biases which society regards as undesirable in 
a judge. The attributes required by a judge can best be 
stated in the words of Robson~
2 ) 
"Society demam.s that its judges be biased in 
certain directions no less insistently than 
it demands they shall be unbiased in others. 
A man who had not a standard of moral values 
which approximated broadly to the accepted opinions 
of the day, who had no beliefs as to what is 
harmful to society and what is beneficial, who 
has no bias in favour of marriage as against 
promiscuous sexual relations, honesty as against 
deceit, truthfulness as against lying, who did 
23. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
ibid 942 
Robson "Justice & Administrative Law" (3rd Edition), p.410 
See also Gee v Freeman (1959) 16 D.L.R. 65, 74 "a judge 
who tries a theft charge may safely be assumed to 
be against theft. 
not ,think wealth better than poverty, 
orthodox religion preferable to atheism, 
courage better than cowardice, constitutional 
government more desirable than anarchy would 
not be tolerated as a judge on the bench of 
any western cou~try". 
The common law distinguishes between two types of bias, 
that arising from having a financial interest and that 
arising from such causes as relationship to a party or 
witness. The former type of bias is described as giving 
rise to an interest, whereas the latter type is described 
as a challenge to favour. 
(i) Bias giving rise to an interest 
24. 
Under this head, any direct pecuniary interest, 
regardless of how small it might be, is sufficient to 
disqualify a person from acting as a judge. The locus 
classicus in this area of the law is the case of Dimes v Grarid 
Junction Canal(l) In this case litigation between 
the canal company and the Lord of the manor, from one of 
whose copyholders it had brought land, had occupied the 
courts for over ten years, before Lord Cottenham L.C. 
pronounced a decree in favour of the company. Dimes, 
the Lord of the manor, discovered that the Lord Chancellor 
owned over ninety shares in the canal company and therefore 
recommenced the action. The House of Lord's set aside Lord 
Cottenham's decree on account of his pecuniary interest. 
It was said by Lord Campbell: 
"No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be, 
in the remotest degree influenced by the 
interest that he had in this concern, but, my 
Lords, it is of the last importance that the maxim 
(1) (1852) 3 H.L. cases 759. Blackstone (3 Comm 299) cites a 
case from Y.B. 8 Hen. 6,18,20 in which the Chancellor of 
Oxford claimed under a charter of Richard II the power to 
try an action of trespass brought against himself which was 
disallowed - see Hewitt "Natural Justice" p.22 
that no man is to be a judge in his own cause 
should be held sacred. And that is not to be 
confined to a cause in which he is a party, 
but applies to a cause in which he has an 
interest. Since I have had the honour to be 
· Chie-f· Justice of -the .. Court of_ Queen's -Bench, 
we have again and again set aside proceedings 
in inferior tribunals because an individual, 
who bad an interest in a cause, took part in 
the decision, and it will have a most salutary 
influence on these tribunals when it is known 
that this Court of last resort, in a case in 
which the Lord Chancellor of England had an 
interest, considered that his decree was on . 
that account a decree not according to law, and 
was set aside. This will be a lesson to all 
inferior tribunals to take care not only that 
in their decrees they are not influenced by 
their personal interest, but to avoid the 
appearance of labouring under such an 
influence". 
Although a judge is not disqualified from hearing an 
.25 
appeal because the case is on appeal from his own previous 
decision RV Hertfordshire Justices< 1 >demonstrates that a 
Judge may be disqualified from hearing an appeal if he has 
a financial interest in the outcome. In this case a 
magistrate was disqualified from sitting at Quarter Sessions 
on an appeal from a decision of his own as he had a financial 
interest in the outcome because of his contingent 
liability for costs if the applicant was successful~
2 ) 
In order to disqualify a judge on the grounds of 
bias under the present head, the financial interest must 
be direct. In R v Rand( 3)the Bradford Corporation were 
the owners of waterworks, and were empowered by statute 
to take the water of certain streams, without first getting 
the permission of the mill owners, on obtaining a 
certificate of the justices that a certain reservoir was 
(1) (1845) 6 QB 753 
( 3 ) [J 9 3 9] 2 ALL ER 5 3 5 
(2) See also R v Hendon District 
Council Ex parte Charley 
[1933] 2 K.B. 696 
completed, of a given capacity, and filled with water. 
An application was made to the justices accordingly, which 
was opposed by the mill owners, but after due inquiry the 
justices granted the certificate. Two of the justices were 
trustees of a hospital and friendly society respectively, 
~... 26. 
each of which had lent money to the corporation on bonds 
charging the corporate fund. Neither of the justices could by 
any possibility have any pecuniary interest in these bonds; 
but the security of their cestui qui trust would be 
improved by anything improving the borough's funds and the 
granting of the certificate would indirectly produce that 
effect, by increasing the value of the waterworks. There was 
no grounds to doubt that the justices had acted bona fide. 
The challenge by the mill owners on the ground ijf-financial 
interest failed because the justices could not personally 
be financially affected as a result of the granting of 
permission. 
Therefore, although any pecuniary interest, however 
small, in the outcome of the dispute disqualifies a person 
from acting in a judicial capacity, the mere possibility 
of bias in favour of one of the parties does not !_Es~ factQ 
avoid the justices decision. In order to have a disqualifying 
affect the bias must be shown at least to be real. 
(ii) Bias giving rise to a challenge to favour. 
This type of bias arises from the personal ties existing 
between the judge and a party or witness to the action. For 
example in Cottle v Cottle(
1 )the chairman of a bench of 
(1) [19J9J 2 ALL E.R. 535 
magistrates hearing a summons brought by a wife against 
her husband was a friend of the wife I s mother. This 
relationship was enough to disqualify him from deciding 
the case. Another example may arise where a magistrate 
dealing with licensing applications is a member of an 
organisation campaigning against the sale of alcohol or 
when, for any other reason the same person is both accuser 
and judge.( 1 ) 
While it might seem obvious that a person sitting 
on appeal from his own previous de cision would be held 
27. 
to be biased, the common law has in fact taken the opposi t e 
approach. A judge except where he is expressly 
debarred from doing so by the words of the statute may in fact 
hear an appeal against his own decision without attracting 
a presumption of bias.(
2 ) 
To be distinguished from the situation of a judge 
hearing an appeal from his own decison is the situation where 
a tribunal realises that its ~first hearing was in breach 
of the rules of natural justice and resolves to give 
the matter a second full and fair hearing. While such 
a procedure does not of itself violate the rules of natural 
justice the fairness of the subsequent proceedings will 
be closely scrutinized by the Courts. Where the 
tribunal is the only body with jurisdiction and its first 
decision has been quashed by the court the doctrine of 
necessity will be available to justify its second hearing.()) 
(1) See Law v Chartered Institute of Patent Agents [1919] 
2 Ch 276 
(2) See de Smith (supra) P• 240 et seq. 
(3) For a further discussion of this concept see Wade 
supra pp. 214-215. 
Normally the courts do not enquire whether a 
tribunal was in fact biased, although this may occasionally 
be relevant. Where the disqualifying element is a pecuniary 
interest. 
"The law does not allow any further inquiry 
as to whether or not the mind was actually 
biased by the pecuniary interest" (1) 
However, where the allegations of bias arises from non-
financial factors it is necessary to satisfy a test 
which has been variously described as involving "a real 
likelihood of bias" and "a reasonable likelihood of bias". 
Although there is a great amount of authority( 2 ) 
suggesting what these two phrases might mean; it is 
submitted that they do not indicate a real difference of 
opinion on the correct test to apply, but rather the 
existence of a confusing variety of ways of describing 
one test and a difference of judicial opinion on wha~ 
ultimately is in each case a question of fact,no more 
capable of precise definition than th~ question 11was 
this conduct negligent?" It is this requirement of proving 
a likelihood or suspicion of bias in certain cases 
that lends interest to Sach's L.J.'s suggestion in 
Hannan's case that an allegation that a man has been a 
judge in his own cause is a slightly different ground 
of challenge! 3 ) However, with respect to His Lordship, 
it is submitted that the concept of judging ones own 
cause is better regarded as raising a challenge to favour, 
differing perhaps from other challenges in raising, 
28. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
Per Bowen L.J. in Leeson v G.M.C. (1889) 43 Ch D.336,384 
Described in Hannam v Bradford Corporation f19701 1 W.L.R. 
937, 945 by Widgery L.J. as a "somewhat confusing welter 
of authority 11 
(3) See supra p. 1 3 
~ / 29. 
without more, a real likelihood of bias. 
Lord Hewart C.J. in R v Sussex Justices(
1 ) stated 
the justification for the principle of quashing a decision 
irrespective of a Judge's actual bias when he remarked: 
11 [ItJ is of fundamental importance that justice 
should not only be done, but should manifestly 
and undoubtedly be seen to be done". 
But having accepted Lord Hewart C.J's dictum, every judge 
must also agree that a decision should not be set aside on: 
"The mere vague suspicions of whimsical, 
capricious and unreasonable people ••• mere 
flimsy elusive morbid suspicions should not be 
permitted to form a ground of decision (2) 
Once, however, it is accepted in a particular case that the 
allegation is more than "a flimsy elusive morbid suspicion" 
it becomes necessary to settle what further test or tests 
must be satisfied before the decision can be set aside. 
Some judges clearly believe that there are different 
___ tests__laid_ down in the cases and that it is necessary to 
choose the correct one,{)) a problem which Hannan's case has 
done little towards resolving,since all the members of the 
court agreed that however the test for bias was formulated 
it would be satisfied on the facts before them. Perhaps 
in the final analysis the answer turns on the view the court 
takes of the facts of the case before them. A judge who 
says there is no real likelihood of bias would just as likely 
say there was no reasonable suspicion of bias, and 
conversely a judge who is prepared to find a reasonable 
suspicion of bias is hardly likely to deny a real likelihood 
of bias. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
1924 1 KB 258, 259 
Per Lord O'Brien C.J. in R v Queens County Justices 
1908 2 IR. 285, 294 
See for example R v Barnsley Licensing Justices 1960 
2 QB 167 187 Metropolitan Properties v Lannon 1969 
1QB 577: esp;cially at p.599 per Lord Denning M.R. 
_ 30. 
2. WHEN DO THE RULES APPLY? 
The tendency of the courts in recent times is to 
apply the rules of natural justice to a very wide range 
of decision-making processes. However, the courts have 
failed to provide any satisfactory general test to determine 
when they are applicable. Until a few years ago the duty 
to give an unbiased hearing was defined as lying on any body 
acting judicially - a very vague concept indeed.( 1 ) 
As was previously stated, the courts never attempted 
a satisfactory definition of"acting judicially" and at times 
the courts seemed to be saying that as the body or 
person before the court ought to observe the rules of 
natural justice it was, therefore, acting judicially. 
While some writers( 2 )suggest that nothing would be lost by 
·-·-abandoning .alL_r_afe.r:e.nces to the existence of a g.uty to 
act judicially, the courts continue to refer to this concept ( 3 ) 
and even talk of ''quasi-judicial" functions( 4 ) 
A single test of fairness as formulated by Parker C.J. 
in Re H.K. (An Infant) 
"CTt"J is not, as I see it, a question of acting 
or being required to act judicially, but of 
being required to act fairly". 
would settle both the question as to whether the rules 
apply and as to what are the contents of the rules. This 
test has been adopted in certain areas of the rules, for 
example, the courts, when deciding on applicant's right · to 
have legal representation at a hearing, will adopt the 
fairness test. 
( 1 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
Supra p.2 (2) De Smith, supra p. 
See for example Re Godden n 9717 3 ALL E.R. 20 
See for example Re Godden ibid, per Salmon L.J. a~d Glynn -v 
Keele University [1971] 1 W.L.R. 487, per Pennycuich v.C. 
and Pearl berg v Varty C1972] 2 ALL ER 6 
Thus in Re Pergamon Press Limited( 1 )the Court of Appeal 
held that inspectors conducting an inquiry under the 
Companies Act 1948 must act fairly which meant that the 
directors bad to be given a hearing but it did not mean 
they had the right to cross-examine witnesses. Lord 
Denning said( 2 ) 
"I am clearly of the opinion that the inspectors 
must act fairly. This is a duty which rests 
on them, as on many other bodies, even though 
they are not judicial, nor quasi-judicial, but 
only administrative". 
And Sachs L.J. said()} 
11 ••• as recent decisions have shown, [itJis 
not necessary to label the proceedings 
"judicial" "quasi-judicial", "administrative" 
or tt investigatory": it is the chara cteris ties 
of the proceeding that matter, not the precise 
compartment or compartments into which it falls" 
However, one problem with a single test of ttfairness" is 
that there can be difference of opinion as to what 
fairness demands in a particular circumstance. The courts 
may have given the impression of extending the scope of 
natural justice by using an all. embracing test of fairness 
but in fact, they have at the same time, stultified the 
effect of the extension by the content that is given to 
the rules of natural justice in particular cases.(
4 ) 
(4) See Birtles (1970) 33 M.L.R.559 especially p.561 
31. 
Whether the courts talk of a judicial junction or 
fairness the decision whether or not to apply the rules 
of natural justice to a particular situation seems to 
be a question of policy~ 1 ) If only for this reason, the 
fairness test is preferable since that approach emphasises 
the necessity of balancing various factors, whereas the 
"acting judicially" test can lend itself to the "sterile 
conceptualism" that Birtles speaks of. 
Some judge~ 2 ) argue that instead of the "fairness" test 
replacing the "acting judicially" test in determining 
whether or not the rules of natural justice apply, it has 
created a distinct concept from that of natural justice. 
This means, in effect, that there are two separate questions 
to be asked; firstly "do the rules of natural justice apply 
to a particular circumstance?" If the answ:er to that 
question is no, then it must be asked "what does fairness 
require?" However, the writer submits that there is little 
to be gained by adopting such a twofold test; as it does 
nothing to solve the difficulties of defining "judicial" 
and "quasi-judicial 11 , little or nothing to eoc..tend the 
boundaries of natural justice and is not, therefore, in 
step with the modern trend, and finally such a test would 
merely serve to add further difficulties, in that it is 
difficult to see what fairness would require of the official 
if he was not required to give an unbiased hearing under the 
rules of natural justice. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
See for example Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v Aberdeen 
Corporation [197111 w'.L.R. 1578, 1594 
See for example Lord Pearson in Pearlberg v Harty D 972] 
2 ALL E.R. 6, 17, and the Court of Appeal in Re Liverpool 
Taxi Owners Association 1972 2ALL E.R. 559 
32. 
The courts when discussing the applicability of natural 
justice have resorted to a number of particular factors. 
In Gaiman . v:-National _Association for Mental Health ( 1 ) 
Megarry J. suggested that: 
"It may be that there is no simple test, but 
that there is a tendency for the courts to apply 
the principles to all powers of decision unless 
the circumstances suffice to exclude them. 
These circumstances may be found in the body or 
person making the decison, the nature of the 
decision to be made, the gravity of the 
matter in issue, the terms of any contract or 
other provision governing the power to decide". 
It is proposed to use the circumstances numerated by 
Megarry as factors supporting a submission that natural 
justice is applicable in certain situations such as the 
grayity of the matter at stake, however, special emphasis 
will be paid to factors which lead to an exclusion of 
natural justice as for instance the triviality of the 
__ .decision. 
( i) The person or body making the decision 
There is little doubt that the rules of natural 
justice apply to proceedings in a court of law and 
_, .., .3 J. 
to tribunals such as the disciplinary committee of 
the Law Society, which so closely resemble the 
ordinary courts as to enjoy their absolute privilege 
under the law of libel~ 2 ) But at the other end of 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
the scale are decisions by Ministers. In such cases 
the rules of natural justice may apply - particularly 
in its current guise of f airness, and the present 
trend of the courts - but even then the standard of 
[19711 Ch. 317, 333 Crocker [1961J 1 QB 11 and Leeson v 
Se e for example Addis.v M 
1 (1889) 43 C.L.D. 366; Mayes v ayes General Medical Counc1 
[1971J 1 W .L.R. 679 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
impartiality expected of the Minister may be 
far from that normally expected.(l) 
(ii)_ . .....The- Na.tur.e.. oL _th.e . .d..e..ci.sion_ t_a___ be._.made. 
"Bias" according to Lord Thankerton in 
~a. 34. 
Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning( 2 ) 
was a term to be confined to those who hold judicial 
or quasi-judicial office. But Franklin's case 
may be explained as turning purely on a point of 
statutory interpretation, or simply as another 
example of the judicial attitudes of non-intervention 
which prevailed for a period during and after 
.... World- -War, 2. (_~_),The -rec.en:t <trend o:£,.the . courts suggests 
that Franklin would not be followe.d today. Cases 
on the right to a hearing show the reluctance of 
the c ourt·s to ~int~erfer·e in areas wher·e the nature 
of the decision is regarded by the courts as being 
peculiarly dis·cretionary, for example the admission 
and deportation of aliens. ( 4 ) 
A long line of cases illustratethe difficulty 
of reconciling the rules of natural justice with 
the use by a Minister of knowledge already in his 
or another department, apart from that obtained in 
the particular inquiry in question, and the 
acquisition by the Minister of further evidence before 
coming to a decision~ 5 ) Here as elsewhere in the area 
See for e.xample Franklin v Minister of Town & Country 
Planning 1948 t.x.VxkxRxxaii AC 87 
1948 A.C. 87 
See Wade (supra) p.52 and Smith supra P• . 
See Ex parte Venicoff 1920 3 KB 72 R v. ~overnor of Bixton 
Prison ex parte Soblen 1963 2QB 243, Schmidt v Secretary of 
State for Home Affairs 1969 2 Ch. 149 
See Wade supra pp 194 et seq; Griffiths & Street supra pp 171 
et seq. 
(J 
A ;1 
I 
of the law the trend is towards extending the 
rules of natural justice. 
Cases can be produced to support the view that 
natural justice does or does not apply to decisions 
of such varying bodies as university vice-chancellors 
and examiners, the committees of gentlemen's clubs, 
disciplinary committees of trade unions, architects 
and bishops. However, many of these cases can best 
be discussed in connection with the other factors, 
such as the gravity of the consequences of a 
tribunals' decision or the question of interference 
with property rights. 
35. 
(iii) The gravity of the matter in issue. 
The gravity of the consequences of a decision 
is a further factor to which the courts have 
repeatedly referred although there is a varying 
opinion among the judges on what consequences are 
grave. In R v Senate of University of Aston, Ex parte 
Roffey( 1 ) the court in holding that natural justice 
applied to a body of examiners which considered 
academic and non-academic matters, took into account 
the consequences of the decision~
2 ) Again in Re 
Pergamon Press(J) the Court of Appeal emphasised 
the gravity of the consequences of the publication 
of the inspector's report. However in Schmidt v 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs( 4 )the plaintiff 
(1) 0969] 2 ALL E.R. 964 
(3) Supra 
(5) 
(2) See ibid p. 975 
(4) Supra 
was refused a .right to a hearing before the 
Secretary ·of State decided not to extend his permit. 
No doubt Mr Schmidt would have considered he had 
36. 
as much to lose as the students did in Ex parte Aston's 
case. 
If a proprietory right is affected it is 
without doubt that the courts will regard the decision 
as having a grave consequence and therefore attracting 
compliance with natural justice. In Gaiman v 
National Minister for Mental Health( 1 ) Megarry J. said 
"The mere membership of an association, 
involving no real interest in property 
and no question of livelihood or reputation, 
does not seem to be prima facie a matter 
in respect of which there is any strong 
claim to have the principles of natural 
justice, at any rate on motion". 
However, the proprietary right is not necessarily of 
economic value. In Gaiman's case for example, 
Megarry J. took into account, inter alia the existence 
of a set of statutory rules governing companies and 
their members and the duty of the council to the company 
as a whole which might require great speed whereas 
natural justice would involve delay. On the other hand 
expulsion from a gentleman's club involving interference 
with property rights does require a fair hearing~ 2 ) 
The meaning, therefore, that the courts attach 
to "right" is obviously of great importance if 
interference with a "right" is made an element in assessing 
( 1 ) D 970 Ch 317, 336 . 
(2) See Cassel v Inglis [1916] 2 Ch 211, Lee v 
Showmen's Guild [1952) 2 QB 329 
the applicability of natural justice. The courts 
have given a very wide definition to the term 
"rights'!--and.- .h.ave held it includes such_rights as the 
"right to work"~l)and will protect such a right by 
resorting to the rules of natural justice, at least 
where the complaint is against a union for expulsion 
from membership. The master-servant relationship 
has always been regarded as the classic case where 
natural justice does not apply, but even here 
Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation(
2 ) 
although he threw no doubt on the traditional rule, 
warned that it must be used carefully and confined 
to pure master and servant cases where there is no 
element of public employment or service, no support 
by statute, nothing in the nature of an office or 
s.ta..tus_which is .capable of protection. Following 
this approach to the meaning of right is the dictum 
of Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs()) where he said that the availability 
of natural justice depends on the existence of "some 
right or interest or ••• some legitimate expectation 
of which it would not be fair to deprive without 
hearing what he has to say". Applied to the facts 
of this case Lord Denning held that an alien who was 
refused permission to extend his stay in a country 
beyond the period originally granted had no right to 
( 1) See Wedderburn, "The Worker and the Law" pp 457 et seq. 
(2) C1971J 1 W.L.R. 1578, 1595 
(J) [1969] 2 Ch. 149 
)7. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
to a hearing. If, however the permission to stay 
had been revoked before the expiration of the time 
originally granted, he might well have had a right 
to a hearing because he bad a legitimate expectation 
that he would be allowed to ·stay for the period 
originally granted. 
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Cases in the 1950's such as Nakkuda Ali v Jayarante( 1 ) 
and R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex parte Parker( 2 ) 
when natural justice was out of favour, made a 
distinction between a right and a privilege. This 
distinction was once again revived by the Court of Appeal 
in R v Gaming Board of Great Britain ex parte Benain.( 3 ) 
However, it is submitted that what fairness on 
natural justice demands may vary from case to case 
and the law is not likely to be helped by reliance 
being placed on imprecise distinctions such as between 
right and privilege. A licence to run a casino is as 
closely connected with the "right to work" as 
membership of a trade union. However unattractive 
the distinction between a right and a privilege may 
be, the actual finding in Benaim's case may be regarded 
as a reasonable attempt at reconciling a public policy 
with a private interest. 
C1951] AC 66 
lJ953J 1 W.L.R. 1150 
G970J 2QB 417. This case w~s criticized for its "sterile 
conceplualism" by Birtles L1970] 33 M.L.R. 559, 561 and 
praised by H.W.R. Wade [1970] 86 LQR 309 for setting the 
law "on a better course" and taking away "a jumble of 
confusion". 
(iv) 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
The terms of any contract or other provision 
governing the power to decide. 
39. 
In this final factor in Megarry J's category 
in Gaiman's case the contract or statute may 
expressly exclude the rules of natural justice 
which would otherwise apply, or they may 
by their terms strengthen the argument that the 
rules of natural justice apply. In the latter 
situation the statute or contract, in its 
simplest terms will provide that expulsion from 
a social or profession may only take place after 
. . ( 1 ) 
an 1.nqu1ry. 
Of more difficulty is the situation where 
the contract or statute is silent as to whether 
a hearing is required. Whether the courts will 
imply a right to a hearing in this situation seems 
to depend very much on the factors already 
discussed. However, it may be that 
the silence of a contract is sufficient to tip 
the balance against the applicability of natural 
justice, although if natural justice prima facie 
applies the courts may be very reluctant to 
construe the contract as excluding the rules of 
natural justice. In John v Rees(
2
) a clause 
in the constitution of the Labour Party empowered 
a Branch to take 
See Labouchere v Earl of Wharncliffe (1879) Ch.D. 346 
(expulsion from a club); G.M.C. v Spackman [1943] 
A.C. 627 (s29 of the Medical Act 1958 allowed the G.M.C. 
to strike a doctor off the register after a "due inquiry" , 
[1969] 2 W.L.R. 1294 
" t· ·t d any ac 10n 1 eems necessary ••• whether by ••• 
disapplication of an organisation or expulsion 
of an individual or otherwise". 
40. 
- There was 'iiothirig in the rules or -consti-tut-ion of the-· Latrour 
Party which excluded the application of the principles of 
natural justice even though what was here in issue was 
suspension and not expulsion. It was held that the 
resolutions suspending the activities of a divisional 
Branch and the rights of its officers to handle its funds, 
and the other resolution authorising the national agent 
to re-organise it were nullities, since in both cases those 
who were suspended were not given an opportunity to be 
heard in answer to certain charges. 
It is not easy to see why silence in a contract 
should be of any great importance in deciding whether 
a right to a hearing exists, and even more difficult 
of more difficulty is the situation where the court is 
asked to imply a term into a contract. In Lawlor v Union of 
Post Office Workers( 1 )Ungoed Thomas J. accepted counsel's 
contention that: 
"the rules of natural justice can only be 
implied in a contract (i) if they are not 
inconsistent with what is expressed in the 
contract and (ii) if they are necessary 
to carry it out and therefore must have 
been extended by the parties, and not merely 
if the rules of natural justice make the 
carrying out of the contract more convenient 
and might have been included if the parties 
had thought a bout it". 
Although in this case Ungoed Thomas J. was able to imply 
a right to a hearing the danger of this narrower approach 
( 1 ) C1 965] Ch. 712 
is illustrated by the refusal of the majority of 
the Court of Appeal in Abbott v Sullivan(l) to 
imply a term that a disciplinary committee of a 
union would not expel a member without a hearing. 
Trietf 1(
2
)points out that the rules of natural jus~ice 
should not be regarded as rules whose incorporation 
into a contract has to be proved but as "terms 
implied by law" which can be implied "although it is 
by no means clear that the parties would have agreed 
to incorporate them in their contract ••• They are in 
truth, simply duties imposed by law on the parties 
to particular kinds of contracts". 
The attitude of the courts to the situation where 
the statute is silent on the applicability of natural 
justice is clearly demonstrated by the old case of 
41. 
Cooper v Wardworth Board of Works{)) which still represents 
the prevailing attitude. The Court of Common Pleas 
held that the Board of Works could not exercise its 
power to demolish property without first giving the owner 
a hearing. Willis J. said( 4 ) 
"A tribunal which is by law invested with 
power to affect the property of one of Her 
Majesty's subjects is bound to give such 
subjects an opportunity of being heard before 
it proceeds". 
And Byles J. said: ( 5 ) 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(5) 
"Although there are no positive words in 
which a statute requiring that the party 
shall be heard, yet the justice of the 
Common Law will supply the omissions of the 
legislature". 
1952 1K.B. 189 
Trieijal "The Law of 
{186j) 14 CBNs 180 
ibid 190 
Contract" 2nd pp 165-168 
(4) ibid 190 
-
It is therefore, the gravity of the consequences of 
the dispute which will import a right to a hearing 
into the statute in question. 
Of more interest to the purpose of this text is 
whether the rules of natural justice can be excluded 
by the express terms of a contract. Triet;l( 1 ) 
following his comment on the nature of terms _implied by 
law says: 
"like many other legal duties, they can 
usually be excluded by contrary agreement". 
With respect to that writer, it is submitted that it 
does not necessarily follow that the courts must,or 
in fact, should allow parties the same freedom to exclude 
the rules of natural justice as they have to settle 
other terms as for example the price. The dictum of 
Megarry J. in John v Rees( 2 ) that 
"in the process of construction the courts 
will be slow to conclude that natural justice 
has been excluded" 
may be just as applicable to the question whether public 
policy allows the waiving of a right to a fair hearing 
by express terms as it is to the construction of the 
contract where no such term is included. If, however, 
strictly construed, a contract does purport to exclude 
the rules of natural justice then a question of public 
policy arises but this is a question to which the courts, 
so far have not had to give an answer. 
(1) Supra p. 168 
(2) 1949 1 ALL ER. 109, 118. 
42. 
the 
Lord Denning has frequently expressed/view about 
the impossibility of excluding the rules of natural 
justice by contractual terms.( 1 ) However his views 
may be explicable under a "mans right to work". 
In Russell v Duke of Norfolk( 2 ) Tucker L.J. said: 
"There are, in my view, no words which are 
of universal application to every kind of 
inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal 
The requirements of natural justice must 
depend on the circumstances of the case, 
the nature of the inquiry, the rules under 
which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter 
that is being dealt with, and so forth". 
43. 
The Lord Justice was prepared to hold that under the 
rules of the Jockey Club the stewards could withdraw 
Russell's licence without a hearing. Denning L.J. on 
the other hand, concluded that terms purporting to 
exclude natural justice were probably contrary to public 
policy at least in some cases. 
The Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Victorian Licensing 
Court, ex parte Beggs(J) held that the right to be 
heard may be lost by contracting out. In this case, 
upon the proper construction of the Power of Attorney 
contained in the lease of the hotel, the licensee was 
not at liberty to oppose the application made by the 
owner to the Victorian Licensing Court. Consequently, 
the Court was right in declining to hear the licensee in 
opposition to such application. In the course of his 
judgment, Gowans J. said( 4 ) after repeating Tucker L.J's 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
See Russell v Duke of 
Edwards v S.O.G.A.T. 
[1949J 1 ALL ER. 109, 
l1 964) V. R. 48 
ibid pp 52, 53° 
Norfolk d949-:l 1 ALL E.R. 109 
1971 Ch. 
118. 
speech quoted above 
"-· .... , whatever. standard_ is_ adopted, one 
essential is that the person concerned 
- -- ..s.h..a.uld have a reasonable opportunity of 
presenting his case ••• But even this right 
may be lost to the person concerned 
(subject to considerations of public policy) 
if he has contracted himself out of its 
exercise in such circumstances that the 
tribunal must have regard to his contract 
and its effect, but that opportunity to be 
heard on the existence of his contract and 
its effect; but that opportunity being 
afforded, and the tribunal having determined 
correctly that the effect of the contract 
is that he has not the.. Lri.ght, to be further 
hea. rd ;' :iit i fi.,n in my ·opinion{' no-· 'irifr ingentent 
of the principle _to deny the opportunity 
of further hearing". 
rt is cif 'interest to note that ·ci trint 1 ) suggest 
that the weight of authority supports the view that the 
rules of natural justice may be expressly or impliedly 
excluded, but Grunfield( 2 ) suggests a contra approach. 
It is, therefore, well established that an 
uncorporated trade unions and professional bodies are 
bound to observe the rules of natural justice when 
considering expelling a member, that they are bound to 
(i) follow the procedures laid down in the 
constitution of the organisation. 
(ii) inform the member of what is alleged 
against him. 
(iii) Avoid unnecessary bias in constituting the 
tribunal and; 
(iv) Give the member an opportunity to be heard~)) 
However, there is a question, whether a company which is 
in effect ~n incorporated professional association, or 
a partnership is subject to the rules of natural justice 
Citrine "Trade Union Law" p.281 
Grunfield ''Modern Trade Union Law p.194 
44. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) See Lee v Showmen's Guild of Great Britain {1952.J 2QB 329, 
Taylor v National Union of Seamen 0967J 1 W.L.R. 532 
Johns v Rees L1969] 2 W .L.R. 1294 Fara.mus v Film Artistes 
Association [19641 AC 925, 941, 94 • 
-
which apply when the association or its governing 
body i~- considerin~ whether , a power to . expel a 
member should be exercised. 
45. 
II "() 'T"T'--: 1n,:.: s rp ~n'T'l1P\J, JU-;TIC~ \r,PLY TO \ cm:P,\'.'ff? 
It ic:; :i vell settlerl nrinci.ple of comnany law t~at 
p ersons ,.,i th no·verc; of control of n. companv are unrler a r:li1ty 
to use t'le i.r !lo·,ver hona fi.rle for the benefit of the comnany 
as a '"hole. 'T'hi.s princi;1le anyilie .s enuall:v well to a comnany 
former1 for c:;ome non-comr:1 ercial :,urpoqe as it clops to a companv 
forme~ for some commercial or tradin~ purnose, hut there 
jc; n nuestion whether there is snperairled some furt!ier 
nhli ~ ,ti.on to observe t: e rules of natural iusti.ce. 
The le a ding ~ n~li.sh authority is the decic:;ion of 
46. 
:1-!egarry J. in Gaiman v. ~hltional .\ssoci<ltion for ~·ental !Tealth(
1
) 
In this case the associ:1tion, a company limi. ted by rruvrantee, 
w:,s a hj ,rh]v reputahle chnritable borlv concerned, inter alia, 
vi.t." ·, the ;ires(>rvation of mental health anrl the ;1revention 
and treatment of mental disorders. The \ssociati.on had a 
council of ~ana r e ~ ent. The rate of membership applic,nts 
harl heen sten:li ly increasin1~, some of these apnl icnntc:; appe r1. red 
to be Scientologi..;;ts, a s well as some of the existin<.; mcmhers. 
'T'he exi .c:;t.in r; r1 e 111 bers susrectecl of bein i~ Scientolo;ists were 
exre 11 erl hy the Council , without any nnt ice or he:iring. 
Tt wac:; provirle~ by the article ~ of ~s.;;ocia tion of the Company 
article that: 
11 :\ member of the as!';oci,tion shall forth,• ·i.th 
ccac:;e to he a rae ~her:-
( \) 
(R) If he i.s reriue s +.ed hy resolution of the 
Council to re c: i ~·n, 1--iut so that a member 
so re'luesterl to re.;;i~n mav within seven 
rlav<; after riotice of the resolution shalJ 
have heen "iven to ~im by noti.ce in 
wri ti.ng to the ':;ccret~r.v of the ac:; s oci ·,tion 
arrenl a ': ciin r.: t st1 ch resolution to the 
associ .,tion in :,;ennra] lT'Cetin ,~, in •vhich 
case the cot1ncil <.;h;:ill with all reasonr¼hle 
( 1 ) [rn 71 J 1 r h '.) 1 7 
rlespatch convene a general mPetinr to consider 
the ·1~, tter, anri in the event of the arrer.11 
being- ,<ntccessful, the rec,olution re0,uec;tjn.r,-
t'1e rne .. •ber to resiirn shall he vnic:I ah initio" 
~i~ht of t~e ~cientolo~ists exncllerl issued a writ nnd 
notice of moti.on claimino; ri-hts of n-1emherc:'1in 0f the associ,tinn 
1 nrl j n i u n c t j ons a '2' ;i in c; t, t he ', o l , J in!"" o f the a c; c, o c i ::i. t i. on ' c, 
im:-ienrlinn: <Teneral r.1eetin'!; •v;P10ut. ;1ermittin~ t'iem to nttenrl 
'1nd vote. 'T'he T>laintiffs cnnte'ltlerJ, inter ali.a, that article?('~) 
hart been a:;1nlicrl i.nvf\licil:v in that the princinle of nat11ri1l 
justice 1rn •1 'lot been col"l n lied ,1·i.th. 
'
1e'Tarry ,J. a7.:reed th:it the :--rinci:iles of nat>.1rc1J .iuc:ti.ce 
',nrJ not heen compli.erl "'ith hut 1,el·-l t."1at those rules cii.rl not 
applv to t"1e exnulc;ion of the members from a comnanv so as 
to afforrf them a ri <c,· ' ; t to be he ·tr 0l before expulsion. TTi.s Honour'c, 
rea<:onc; for reac '' in'" tJ->e crrnclusion he di'i ·<.·ere fourfold. 
Fir c; t l y , t" e co u n c j 1 owe cJ ;i_ rl u t y t. o t he a<:; s o c i. ;.~ t i on t o e x e r c i c; e 
its powers unrler article 7(~) in wh a t it believer! to he 
U1e he<:;t interest of the n.c:c:ocint.ion, arrl if ncces.s;:iry 1vi.t.h 
r•;re·1t sp8erl, 1.• .. herea.c; n,tnr,1 .iuc;tice would involve rle1n.y; 
">ec0nrllY, ;:i rticle o::; nro,·i·1 in':'.' -f'or the cxnulc:;on of members in the 
c,se of com ~n nicc; limiterl hv c;h~res harl been sho···n to he v1li~, 
therefore, tiwv '"ere ., l .sn v;:ilicl in tle cc1. se of coninrinics lirnitecl 
hv '"nara;,tee ·1· '10. re t 11e me•nbers h1rl onl:v li'1'itei nro:-'"rt .v ri ·rhts; 
thirrlly '\rticle ?(n) ,;ave ;.-n c1hsolute nnrl unrestricted pou·er ,nd 
t',e ·,·orriin"· militated ,~ ·1inc:t ;-in:v exerci s e of th(' ·1ri.nri..-.lc c; 
of n ;i tur1l .iustice; fnurt'•l:v, t 11i -; ·1·.1 "' not i.l c, s c ... ,,ere jsc;ucs nf 
imr,ort,rce .,nrl ;- ravity br ,vonc 111erc .ne111bers 11ip of t~e ::i.ssoci·1tion 
h,v "egnrr:v .J. ;i.re ;,ossih lY incorrect on tJ,e ~e neral princi..-.1 of 
n , tiirnll ju c: tice. 
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fnced with a compnnv li~itcrl hy g u~r nn tee. T', 1 • c; , '1 cc or, j n <?: 
to 'lie; nonour, t11c com r,'\ n _v 1·::1.s .:i len;:il entity whoc;e ;,owerc:; hnrJ to 
h e exPrci c; cd for the benefit or t~nt cntitv, ani t½o~e cxercisin~ 
t',p r,o•"erc: of C'{nulc:;ion ·1·crc bonn-'! not T,cr01y hy tJ-,cir rlllticc; 
to··:~1 rdc; t',e co ~1r. anv, ·v' : ic'-, rni,:,:~1t. be inconsistent •.,·i t11. t11e 
h f t 1 . t· (1) o _c:c rv4rice o n-1 t•rn JUS ,ce. 
ri "' i.,ts ,nrl :~o·•·nrc; ,, re to he e-v-erci >e<i .for the benefit of t''c 
,\ d i r c c t or c:; ' , n re c: w i t 1, :::1 n a;; en t an rJ a tru c:; tee t h c c J, ~ir R c t er i s t i c 
of hei.·,,,. in a f:irluci:-iry rel·,tion: one in~ ,ic~ one of the p.:irties, 
for his comf1:,ny . The duty i.m r oscrl on .Jjrectorc: in t!,e exerci c:; e 
Tn tbe firc;t plnce it rle~,nds th ~t the ~jrector 
act bona firle for t~e benefit of t~P company, and in the seconrl 
rl a ce it rc,p•j rec:; t~ at Pven thm:;h he m:iy in fact h,.ve acte~ 
bonci. fi_-le for t'1c benefit o-f t'1e compa ny, he must not allo"1 
himsel-f to fnlJ jnto iJ. c;it1nUon in •v 11i.ch 1,is intcrec:;ts confljct, 
0r may possjbly ,on flirt .. ,;t,h tl10 c; e of t 11e comp ;'.l n_v. Lorrl Cran"'"'0rth 
I • r. 
(1) 
( ~) 
"[Tt] is cl rul<' 0f universal a"!)plic:ition t.h'lt no one 
havin, '.jt1c'1 ·!11 tie .:; to cljsc'rir/ie s 11:1Jl be a 1 loi•·cc1 to 
enter · into cn ·~n.~c111e rtc=- in 1uhic'1 he has or can h ,_ve a 
pcrc:;011al inte~est conflictin.r; or 0·.•h ich possihly m~y 
conflict with the intere<:;ts of thnse whnm he is 
bound to protect". 
Ihid p.:qr, C-T) 
( 1 o~A) ? r. ~er 1? 0 1 1 1?Rn (), ) ' t - ,·,q • ' • - (' 
48. 
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( 1) 
Profe c::s or Parsons is rather criticnl of the contrast 
bet•.veen the s tern chit:v of £:OO'l faith which tl1 e courts fiave 
i mpoc;erl on cJirectors and the some• ·hat ] oose stanrlnrri of care t1iey 
1,nve ;:i,sl-erl of thern. 
" .Jtirl i; e s , ":e .qre t.o]rl are equipped to as :, ess 
;~o orl f;:i,i th hut ~eneral ly t 11ey lack the comrnercial 
exncricnce on ·vhat to founrl the fine distinctions 
.. ,- 11 icl. .. , oul ' l he cA.1Je,l for if t1:e law impo se d 
some t 11in 6 more t'1an a relaxed s t n r,d;:irrl of c :1re. 
1eas~urinv observ , tion is offerer! to the effect 
tr.nt, so long as t' 1e law en s ttres ti, a t directors' 
~e a rts a re ' pure, it may not ~atter that some 
rlirectors a re incompetent". 
It is , t~ ~refore ohvious tb a t the firlici ur:v riuties io not 
a ff o rd as mt•cj.., p rotect.i " n to minorities ac:: t 11e principles of 
natur a l ju c-; tice . I G . ' (2) " J \ d l 1 n a1m n n s cr1.se ~egnrry . , ~a a . rea ~y 
rejecterl a submission by t"ie plaintiff ' s covnse l that the 
counci 1 of t "i c .\ssociation h ari ar:terl j n breac 11 of t J, eir 
fiduc:i <i ry dutv towarrls the associntion clnr'! hell th a t their 
action wns in the hest interest of t1ie ac::socintion . 
,:' 1en t?-,e courts spc;:i 1, of tre ·l irectorc:: act i O f3: for the benefit 
to t "ie compa ny as a whole t"iev rln not ~e,n the abstract 
cor po r 1te e ntity hut t},e me7.bers as a ,.,h o le . 
(:"3) 
Sea] v su~.<~es ts th;,t 
t 11e reason for t' ·, i. s conce p t i s historical: in the unincorpor a ted 
cleed of s ettl enent co m;>n ny from w' ·ich t l1 e rresent rep;istere:i 
co rnT)a nv i s descended the meP1be rs were tl-:e comran~ nnrl the 
suh s enl'ent introdnction of incor ; or ,1 tion -l id not rlisturb the 
irle ~ t j..,~ t t h e ~ jrectors shnuld h,ve th~ he~efit of Rll the members 
in mi.nrl . 
It is a lways easier to decide wliether an act of the 
rlirector ~ i s bona fidc for t h e c omnany ' s henef:it if they are 
49. 
(1) "The directors duty of good fai t h" (1967) 5 Melb. Uni. L. R. 395 
( 2) Supra pp 330 H-3331 
( 3) Sealy 1967 Camb. LJ 3 5 . 
dealing with matters which relate to matters affecting 
the rights of member..s_inta:i:__se 
Natur~lly e~_ugh__ _the _ _ w.ider __ the ambi.t_ oi _the_ power 
conferred on the directors the more difficult it will be 
for the court to determine the proper purpose of the power. 
It is for this reason that the English Courts have implied 
a subjective test and leave it up to the board of 
directors to determine the proper purpose. Lord Greene M.R. 
50. 
in Re Smith and . Fawcett Limi.ted ( 1 ) said that . the directors....must 
act 
"Bona fide in what they consider - not what a 
court might consider - is in the interests of 
the company and not for any co !lateral purpose". 
Such a test would mean that it is up to the directors 
to decide the purpose of a power and their determination 
could not be reviewed by a court unless it was a determination. 
It is suggested ( 2 ) therefore, that it is much easier 
to i~ply the requirements of natural justice than it is to 
determine what is in the best interests of the association. 
This view is reinforced by the knowledge that the Court's 
state that in a Court of Law not only must justice be done 
but manifestly be seen to be done. 
Because the rules of natural justice are primarily 
concerned with the manner in which the power is exercised 
and not with whether or not the power is in the interests 
of the association, the observance of the rules of 
natural justice must go a long way to establishing the 
good faith of a director. It is submitted, therefore, that 
the courts' first inquiry should be to see if the expulsion 
( 1) [1942] Ch. 304, 306 
(2) See Hepple 1970 C.I.J. 185,186 
r 
is procedurally correct, in compliance with the rules 
of natural justice. If the procedure is correct then the 
court should see if the power was exercised bona fide 
for the benefit of the company as a whole. 
Further, in New Zealand and Australia, Megarry J's view 
might not be concurred in as it would probably be held 
51 • 
that the directors must exercise their powers for the benefit 
of the total membership viewed in the light of their 
corporate bbjects, and not merely in the interests of a 
~~rticular ~~ctio& b~ the ·~emtie~sh~~~ (
1 ) 
Megarry J. was of the opinion that the power of 
expulsion granted by article 7(B) of the Company's articles 
was such as might require the council to exercise that 
power with great speed. It is a well accepted principle 
of natural justice that even though parliament has not 
used words designed to exclude natural justice, the nature 
of the power may be such that expediency requires their 
exclusion, for example, a policeman arresting a person does 
not have to give the apprehended person a hearing because 
to do so would unduly obstruct the performing of his duty. 
Whenever the court can see that the power is of such a 
nature that its immediate exercise is required it will be 
conclusive against applying the rules of natural justice. 
However, in Gaiman's case under the articles of association 
if it was intended to propose a member for election as an 
ordinary member of the council notice must be given not 
less than three nor more than twenty-one days before the 
(1) See Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v Ure 
(1923) 33 C.L.R. 199 
-
date appointed for the meeting. In the present case the 
plaintiffs had given only five days notice. As the 
third day, the latest date possible fell on a Sunday, 
notice would have been impossible to give. The plaintiffs, 
by their own actions had created the sense of urgency, 
nevertheless it is submitted that the power of expulsion 
from the Associauon is not analogous to the cases where it 
has been held that an obligation to observe the rules of 
'natural just-ice "10\J.lcr =nba_-trucJt ·tl1e ' taking. o:fh pL'ompt 'acti-on • 
In the great majority of cases in which expediency 
has been held to vitiate the rules of natural justice there 
las been some element of public safety or public health, 
or the power has been invoked to abate a public danger or 
nuisance. There have been cases outside these categories 
in which the court has allowed an official to deviate from 
the rules, ( 1 )but it seems doubtful if the courts would 
uphold these decisions today under the present notion 
of "fa.ir·ness". In Gaimans case there was no direct element 
of public safety involved, and the arbitrary time limit 
allowed for putting forward nominations (18 days) would 
seem to imply against there being any sense of urgency. 
Also a company can extend the latest possible time for 
giving the notice merely by altering its articles. 
If Megarry J's analogy were correct it would mean that 
in a situation where there is a take-over bid by a "corporate 
raider" ihe directors could force a sale of the shares 
held by the offerer company, merely on the grounds of 
expediency. 
( 1 ) Ex parte Venicoff's ~920] 3KB 72, Bishop v Ontario 
Securities Commission (1964) 44 D.L.R. (2d) 24, R v 
Randolph 1966 S.C.R. 260 
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On the other hand, however, Megarry J. should have 
reasoned that there were adequate alternative proceedings 
provided for in the articles, in that the expelled member 
had a right to appeal to the council in a general meeting. 
Such an approach was not referred to by Megarry J. but it 
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would seem to have been more in step with an accepted exception 
to the application of the rules. 1 
Megarry J, in cming to his second reason for refusing 
to apply the rules of· natural justice, equa~ed a company 
limited by shares and a company limited by guarantee and 
held that because a company limited by shares could validly 
expel a member under the articles even though it deprived the 
member of valuable property rights, so should a company 
limited by guarantee be as able to do as no such rights 
were affected. Megarry J. relied on the fact that the plaintiffs' 
"liberty, property or means of livelihood" were notat 
stake. 
Megarry J. reached his conclusion by drawing an 
anology from the cases dealing with companies limited 
by shares where in his view it could be readily inferred that 
the principles of natural justice did not apply to such 
companies. However, these cases - Re Gresham Life Assurance 
Society ex parte Penny( 2 ) where there was a restriction on 
the right to transfer shares; Borlands Trustee v Steel Bros. & 
Co. Limited(J)and Hunter v Hunter( 4 ) dealing with 
pre-emptive rights - the question of the applicability of 
natural justice did not arise, nor did the court 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
( 3 ) 
(4) 
Purnell & Whan~rei High School Board. See infra p.36 
.11_973] 1 ALL E.R. 200 
. (1897) 8 Ch. App 446 
t1901J 1 Ch. 297 
[1936] AC 222 
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consider its application in any way. The analogy 
does seem questionable in light of the decision in 
Enderby Town Football Club Limitea · v The Football Association 
Limited( 1 ) a nd Pett v Greyhound Racing Association Lirnited( 2 ) 
Both these cases involved disputes with a limited company, 
and in both cases the court proceded on the assumption 
that the rules of natural justice were applicable to it. 
Underlying Megarry J's second reason and the application 
of ·the l rules of 1nat~r~l justi~e i~ the sassumpti~na th~t : the 
rules of natural justice do not apply to a corporated body. 
As has already been shown()) an unincorporated association 
may exclude the principles of natural justice provided 
that the rules of the club do so expressly.( 4 ) This view has 
also been expressed in New Zealand in relation to societies 
registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, ( 5 )in 
Perry v Fielding Club Incorporated~
6 ) In that case the 
respondent had been charged with having grossly misconducted 
himself within the meaning of the appellant club's rules 
by consuming liquor and becoming intoxicated on the club's 
premises when he was under a prohibition order. The club 
committee held an inquiry at which the respondent appeared. 
He was aware of the details of the charges pru'erred against him 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
(6) 
ll 971J Ch 591 • 
D969J 19B 125. For a discussion of these two cases see 
supra p. 9 et seq. 
supra pp. 24-28 
See also MacLean v The Workers Union [1929J 1 Ch.602 
Mac ueen v Frackelton (1908) 8C.L.R. 673, Polsuns v Toronto 
Stock Exchange 1965) 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210. 
See D.J.White "The Law relating to Associations registered 
under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908(unpublished 
Thesis,Victoria University of Wellington ~972). 
0929JN.Z.L.R. 529. 
-
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before attending the meeting, but having attended 
failed in the opinion of the committee to justify hisoonduct, 
and was therefore, suspended from membership. The 
respondent brought an action against the club to have the 
suspension removed, and for damages, on the ground that the 
committee's decision, having been arrived at without affording 
him an opportunity of cross-examining witnesses, was 
contrary to natural justice. 
In the Supreme Court Smith J. granted tlie ·injtiriction 
and awarded damages because 
"Where the club concerned is a gentlemen's social 
club, where the charge is one of gross misconduct, 
where the member denies the charge and is 
prepared to face an inquiry, it is, I think, 
a principle of natural justice that he shall be 
present when those who -allege the act~ of-gross 
misconduct against him give their evidence before 
the committee, and that he shall have the right 
to cross examine them (1) " 
Although the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by 
the club as it thought that the decision of the committee 
was arrived at in good faith, and the respondent had been 
given every facility for presenting a defence, both the 
joint judgment of Herdman and Adams JJ. and the judgment of 
Blair J. accepted that the principles of natural justice 
did apply to decisions of societies relating to expulsion 
- : of · members. 
" ••• no matter how unfair or how unjust the 
action of an expelling tribunal might be, 
if it acted in accordance with its rules 
and in good faith the person expelled has no 
redress. To this we add another rule 
propounded by Kelly C.B. in Wood v Wood 
[LR. 9 Ex 196 3. In speaking of the powers 
(1) ibid p. 534. 
exercised by a committee of a society 
he said: "But ~hey are bound in the 
exercise of their functions by the rule 
_ expressed in the maxim" Audi alteram 
partem", that no man shall be condemned 
to consequences resulting from alleged 
misconduct unheard and without having 
the opportunity of making his defence. 
This rule is not confined to the conduct 
of strictly legal tribunals, but is 
applicable to every tribunal or body of 
persons invested with authority to 
adjudicate upon matters involving civil 
consequences to individuals" (1) 
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And Blair J. said 
"This court can interfere with the affairs 
of a social club only when its conduct 
of its own affairs transgresses what has 
been called natural justice, but which 
might better be called the fundamental rules 
of justice. This cannot mean that the 
inquiry must be conducted according to the 
procedures of a formal Court. It can mean 
n0-more---than tha .t-the- accused - person in.... the 
circumstances of the case is given a fair 
and reasonable opportunity to answer the 
charge. And there might be a case where the 
circumstances are such that the denial of 
an opportunity to confront some or all of 
his accusers may be evidence of want of 
natural justice." (1a) 
Furthermore in New Zealand ( 2 )and the United Kingdom()) 
it is well established that a trade union wishing to 
exercise a power to expel, suspend or discipline a member 
of the union must proceed in accordance with the requirements 
of natural justice. But unlike the United Kingdom most 
trade unions in New Zealand are incorporated under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973 and its various predecessors, a 
point which has not hindered the New Zealand courts from 
implying that the rules of natural justice still apply. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
NZLR 
NZLR 
(3) 
( 1 a) 
Per Herdman J. ibid pp 542, 543 
Law v Wellington Working Mens Club (1911) 30 NZLR 1198; 
McGregor v Young 1920 NZLR 766; Morten v Nicoll 1932 
685; Millar v Smith 1953 NZLR 1049, Armstrong v Kane 1964 
639. 
See Annarnunthods v Oilfields Workers' Trade Union 1961 AC 945 : 
MacLean v Workers Union 1929 1 Ch 602. 
Per Blair J. ibid p. 546. 
Megarry J's proposition that the rules of natural justice 
do not apply to an incorporated association might not be 
accepted in Australia either, for the application of the 
rules of natural justice in relation to trade unions 
incorporated -under tne Conciliation -and -Arbitration Act 
190~ - 1959 is common-place. For example in Wishart v 
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Australian Builders Labourer Federation( 1 ) and Lynch v McLachlan( 2 ) 
it was held that a power to disqualify a person ~rom 
i. •liol:ding i office' is ih r tbe ~nature of •a penalty arrd must 
be exercised according to the principles of natural justice. 
England does not in fact have an equivalent Act to 
the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 or the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, ( 3 ) therefore many 
voluntary associations register as companies under the 
Companies Act. It does not seem to follow that a 
incorporated society achieves some additional status upon 
incorporation so as to avoid attracting the presumption 
that the rules apply, that it did not have before 
incorporation when it was in fact bound by the rules of 
natural justice unless the rules of the club expressly 
excluded their application. Hepple( 4 ) points out the 
impl/ations that such a rule would have if the attention of 
" the courts had been drawn to the corporate status of a 
University in a number of recent decisions.( 5 ) 
( 1 ) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(1960) 2 F.L.R. 298 (2) (1962) 3 F.L.R. 59 
In the case of trade unions, Megarry J. conceded that 
they have some of the attributes of corporate personality 
but not enough to forego the application of the rules of 
natural justice. 
(1970) CLJ 185, 187. 
See R v Senate of the University of Asto~~rte Roffey 
1969 2 QB 53 and Glyn v Keele University 1971 1W.L.R.487. 
Within this pa.rt of his reason, .Megarry J. 
took notice of the fact that: 
"Parliament has provided a generous set of 
statutory rules governing companies and the 
rights of members, as contrasted with the 
exiguous statutory provisions governing 
trade unions and even more -exiguous 
provisions governing clubs" (1) 
As has been previously shown ( 2 )the courts will be very 
slow to construe a statute as excluding the rules of natural 
justice, especially if the statute is silent with 
respect to the expulsion. 
The Privy Council on appeal from New Zealand in the 
case of Furnell v Whangarei High School Board 
( 3 ) 
was 
asked to interpret a set of precise statutory provisions 
---relatinR to-- the ~xpulsion of .a-teacher- -Furnell was a school 
teacher who had been suspended by the High School Board 
after compalints about his conduct and incompetence 
as a teacher had been heard by the board. While Furnell . 
was so suspended he was not entitled to pay, therefore, 
he sought an order quashing the suspension on the 
grounds of natural justice. Furnell had not, in fact, been 
given notice of the charges against him or an opportunity 
to be heard before suspension. 
The Privy Council, however, held by a three to two 
majority ~tha -t Furnel'l was- ,not en.ti>tl ed to ,notice er a 
hearing before suspension because the regulations made 
pursuant ·to theEducation Act set out an extensive code 
of procedure to be followed whenever a complaint was 
made against a teacher. The majority( 4 ) reasoned that the 
(1) supra p.335 
(2) pupea pp 24,25 
(3) for a discussion of this case see Evams (1973)36 MLR 439. 
(4) Lords, Morris, Simon and Kilbrandon. 
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object of the regulations was to provide some 
additional protection for the teacher, and given that 
there were elaborate provisions outlining a hearing at a 
later stage, the omission of the hearing at the 
presuspension stage was deliberate. 
The minority(l) on the other hand, reasoned that the 
it was unfair that a teacher should be suspended without 
a hearing, therefore, the terms of the statutory code did 
not reveal a deliberate omission of the right to be heard. 
Viscount Dilhorne was of the opinion that mere existence 
of statutory code of procedure did not prevent the court 
from applying to the stages of decision-making the 
procedural standards normally implied by the rules of 
natural justice. 
Regardless of which of their Lordships' reasons are 
accepted, Furnell's case does serve to show the reluctance 
of the court to imply an exclusion of the rules of natural 
justice. Furnell's case turns on the question whether the 
statute did provide a code of procedure, however, in the 
Companies Act, on the other hand, there is no provision 
whatsoever relating to the expulsion of members from a 
company. A member's rights and duties are contained in 
the memorandum and articles of association, and not in 
the Companies Act. These two documents are contractually 
binding on members under Section 34 of the Companies Act. 
(1) Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne. 
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The existence of a "generous set of statutory rules" 
-- in the - Companies ·Act ~has no - ~earing &n, th~ question 
of a member's rights. 
·-·· Gaiman '·s .._ case:-0 should --- have , tuv.ned on --. &- ~ question of 
contractual terms. The articles of the Association were 
binding on the members as a contract, and Megarry J's 
third reason was that the wholly unrestricted expulsion 
powers in article 7(B) in fact excluded the principles 
of natural justice, not the statute. Future 
courts~ it is- aubmi~ted, should be slow to interpret 
the Companies Act, regardless of how "generous" the Act is, 
as excluding the rules of natural justice. 
The fourth reason o~ Megarry J's that the membership 
of the association involved no real interest in property 
and no question of livelihood or reputation, should go 
to decide any initial question of jurisdiction rather than 
to the ground of intervention itself. 
Despite the incorrectness of ~he reasoning in 
Gaiman's case the writer would agree with the ultimate 
decision if for the third reason alone. Generally the 
courts are very reluctant to interfere with the internal 
management of a Company's affairs. The contractual effect 
of the article in the present case would support 
Megarry J's finding. However, Russell v Duke of Norfolk(
1
) 
and Edwards v S0GAT( 2 ) do show that in some circumstances 
the validity of contractual terms purporting to exclude 
natural justice may be void as contrary to public policy. 
(1) '.1949J 1 ALL E.R. 109 
(2) L1971J Ch. 354. 
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This will certainly be the case if there is some 
interference with - a mans' "right to work". 
Nevertheless, the company's officers and organs 
should always start with t~e presumption that 
the rules of. natural justic~ _apply where any question 
of expulsion is involved and then see if the contractual 
foundation on which shareholders rights are based, make 
it valid to expel the individual without a hearing. 
61 • 
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TII no rrr rr.; :: l1J.7 S " F' ' l \'T'l nnL J U~'T'JC: 7, \ TTLY 1'(' \ D \ '{T\1:.': S 'lI:!' 
_\ p1rtners hip i s the r e l ,1. tion ".rhich c:; ubsi s ts between persons 
c ., rryin '!. on a hu s iness i.n common ".' l th :t view to profi. t • It involve c:; 
a contract hetween t h e p ~rtner s . . \s a ru J e each partner cnntri. b11tes 
either propert:v, skill, or l a hour, hut thi c:; is not essential. 
'T' l:e rel ·1tion 11etween n :1rtner c:; i c:; '10t tl1:oi. t of rlet>tor a nrl cre <Ut or, 
n or :ci re t h e r a rtners, -:1s c:; uch, trus tees for e:i cJ, other er for 
th e ir firm. The exi s tence of a bv c:; ine s s is e s sential. The ·vnrd 
"f i rm'' i s a short, c o llective n am e for the indivirluals 1'.'h o cons titute 
t h e partners, anrl the n c1 r,e unrJer wh ich t'iey tr a rie is thei.r firm 
n a me . rr1ie fi.rm, 11nJike, the co mpa n v is not a le g aJ enti.ty distinct 
from the member s . 
F.xpul s ion from the partnership 
:\s •vi th a n expulc;i on of a memher from a n unincorporaterl 
as soci. n ti.on, th e re i s no inherent p owe r to exp el a p a rtner from 
a p a rtner s hip, therefore in the a h s ence of exp ress a g ree~ent a mon~ 
the partners conferrin ~ the power, no ma jority of p 8rtncrs of a 
fjrm h a s the p o•ver to exI)el a p artner. Thi s common l a w po c:; iti.on 
is •riven .st a tutory force hy Se ction '.2 8 of the Pa rtnership .\et 1 008 
whjch stntes: 
"\ mn,iori ty of the partners cannot expel ;:i ny p n rtner 
unl es s a p ower to rl o s o bas heen conferrerl hy 
expre c:; c:; a "'ree ment between the p <1rtner s 11 • 
IIowever, a rower to e'<re l mu s t he rlisti.n!"'ui s herl from sneci c1 l 
provic:;ionc:; c1s to t},e di s solution of t h e p a rtnerc:;hip whi.ch place the 
power to r.i.ssolve the pcl.rtner s hip, on the occurrence of certain 
events occurring in the !l a nds of one p;:i.rtner of the fjrm. 
"'l' ere t h e pn rtnership a g reement confers powers upon one of t'ie 
partners to r1issolve tl1c fir m i. f t h e c o wluct of th e busines s or 
the result of the hu c:; ine s s, sh o u]rl not he to th e s a ti s f;1ction of 
one of the pa rtners a;ipointerl in t 1, e a !!'recrnent, th , t is not 
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equivalent to a power of expulsion anri i .'3 easy to di5tin~ujsh 
fr0m <,uch a po,ver. On the otlier hand, wliere the azreement expressly 
proviries that a partner mav he exrel 1 ed for certain conctuct 
nr jn certain events,the application of the ~eneral principles 
~nvernin~ the exercise nf t~e power of expul">ion is also clear. 
Tfo·•:ever, more rlifficlllt i"> the situ 01tion "'here this last mentionerl 
rirovision js expressecl r1.c; a po~ver to "terminate" the 
p,1rtnerc;hip. The r1ttiturle of the courts towards such a nrovision 
c; eems to oscjll~te hetween re~arrlin~ it as a po~er of exrulsion on · 
the one hand anrl one of "c8ncel lc1.tion" or di">solution of the 
nartnership on the other, depenrlin~ on the conrluct of the co-nartner. 
'!,'here a power to "terminate" or rlissolve a partnership is exercised 
by the co-partners in respect of the conrluct of the offenrling 
partner it may often occur that on such rlissolution the partners 
\' 11 0 'SOU " ht the terriin -,ti.on ·vil l themselves continue in business 
minus the offenclin~ partner. In reality, the situ~tion seems 
inrlistin~uishahle to that arisin~ when the partner is expelled, 
particul 0rly if, as is usually the cas e, the a g reement provirles 
that the expelled ~artner is to have his share paid out on the 
same terms as if he ha~ retirerl from the firm. nu t w 'i i 1 e t h e 
practical result of t)1e t,"O procerlures may appear to :1:n.ount to the 
s;:irne thing as fn.r as tl1c exclncter'I partner is concernerl, in )e'!'al 
t8rris the ,Ji.c;tincti.on p,ust be preserved since if what has been 
exercised is a "power to expel", the exercise of t 11:1t power wi 11 
he sub .iect to , stricter scrutin.v h,v the co11rts thr1.n '.l'ill the 
exercise of a power to terminate nnrl in nny event unrler the terms 
of the p:irtnershi.p a"'ree .. ent it "> el f the ri::hts of nn expel Jed 
pn.rtner may not, anrl often will not, coincirle with those of a partner 
whose connuct ,._,as been cxpe] Jed, it i.s to be expected that the 
consenuences of his exrulsion will be sti.pulat.erl in the pnrtnership 
n ·.>.; recrnent and in vi.e•v of t1e nature of expul c:; ion he •dll norm:1.llv 
be "pairl out", ac:; if he were a retirin~ pctrtner. "/hereas if 
.. 
1-ii.s conrluct cauc:erl the rlissolution of the r.:irtnership the 
offcnrling rartners ri~hts, in the absence of an a~ree ~ent to 
t~e contrary, =ill ½e trenterl ,sin a disso)uti.on ~nd ryin~i.ng 
11'.1 of tl--e firm •:11ich l"l ay ~rorluce a rlifferent re s ult.. ~:ore over, 
rljc;snlution 111;-iy he av a il,hlP •vlere it ics not nossiolc to e'xnel 
, n,rtncr , nri ~av he orrlcred, even if some of the nartners do not 
I . . t ( 1 ) rec:;1re 1 • -
1 • \Jot i c P o f -:x11u J c; i. on 
~~erP i c: no ~enera] statutorv re~uire~ent ns to the form 
0r c: 1• ffici. P:icv of notice to he "'iven to U1e expelled ri ,rt.,... er. 
0 bviou .:; lv, ::- non o: h he must, receive notice i.n s crne form of ', is 
partners intention before h e cnn be effectivclv excelled. 
i s exerci c: erl mny itself expres s ly or bv implic a tion provide for 
tlie tyn0 of noti.cr to he ';iven a nrl, if so, th,t provision 
mnst 1-Je stri ct 1 y ohservP.rl. Tf n notice of exnul s inn is s~rverl 
expul s ion, t.h q t nnticP c ., nnot he invo'k2d i'l"' n ,iotice of 
~issoluti nn of t ~e r , rtners~ip unrler qnoth0r cl~ucse nf t~e 
o <;ree ·.,c nt, ·1 n ·1 t" e 
renui r ,'.' rl tn c n nc11r in its e xc rci "' ~ +~i ~ n~ 
'"'liscnnr111ct of'., r .,rt.n'!r, 1-ii c: co- ~J;i rtnPrs ";Pre c rti.tlerl to 
(1) <oec 1,ni ·lit v ,,ell (1 88 7 ) 1-i; V .1,. ' I . 878 1nd "n-l ·!c: ,_, ')ro:11fiPlrl (H' T1) 
\. T • ) • 8 
( '.2) ( 18!'1~) f\ !fa rP "i ~r; 
.'.'.':ls c nnr~orl, ,\ '1f~ ']irl l"Ot r e t11rn to ·.nr k . 
T ',e rar t r 0 r :;'· iD CO'lsic::ter! nf '.:i .,, it i,, , ''11 1:, -:: 
t'1ou _'." '1 T1nt a J i c;s0 lution ac; r ro v i ~ed for iP t he a ~reemcnt ,::rn.rl 
t r C' re f or e '!1 o t i 'l v o J v i n ,:,; t 1~ e co n , e q u e n r e c; o f ~i c1 i s s 0 lt1 t i. o n 11 n 4 e r 
t" cit ar;reernen t. 
Tn t he ' :cw ?;e ·,1 -n--'l C A.Se of '"ilkie v :''i l 1de 
( 1) 
~) ' 
1 i r; 11 n r ~ t c c "( c e s s n r t o s t c 11 ::in e v: t en { ;1 c:: t o n f f P. c t " i. "'> ::i '1 i 1 i t v 
nart~e r s . 
5 • 
:rnrl t n 1-- en , n .. ctive p'l.rt i11 t''e ·11,rnn-:emcnt 0 f the "n•'-inf:'SS. The con-luct 
of t 11e ria rtn0r w., '., s uch as to .iustify :, ; s p;:i.rtnerc;' C'<pellin'T him 
unrJpr thi. s provision. 'Jo·\·cver, t 1·p nffen-lin :: p:1r tn~r •v;:is in 
( 1) ( 1 0()0) 1 P '1 . 7 • T n 7~1. 
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\ustr:ilia in a hahitu:-i.] state of rlr11nl,~nness. \/ot i CP. '.VEl 'S 
t1-' erefore c;erverJ 0n hi.f'l i.n \u s tr,,li.a. 
); e'ti .,l f ,-it the tri:-i.J thr,1t he "-'"S in .sl'ch a state of -lri 1 nkcnness as 
to 1-i ,we been i.nc ;rnah]e of un •ler s tnndin-: the n a ture a nd effect 
of t',e notice, :::. rl·r.,rrls .J. held t 11.:1 t t ~e " oti.ce of exnu1si.on 
l-iarJ j n f·-1 ct heen -=;ervcrl nrion him h,v the r,ther p;1rtncrc; . I.Ti_ c; 
·:onot1 r dre1•: nn c1 :1c1.lo '" v fro'Tl the se rvice of nntice on n lunqtjc 
partner a nd sni1 it coulrl be no Ans~e r that at the ti me of t he 
s ervice of t 11e notice u p on l1i.m, he •v:=ts i.n s uch 3 state from r]rink 
,s to he jncapab)e of tin'ierstanrlin,,. its n a ture ,nrl effects. 
C] ::11Jse3 ryrovir!in~ for a po·ser to ex;-icl a partner a re 
c 0 n.struerl stri ctissi.mj .iuri s anrl the n , rtnerc; who seel, to 
enforce t h e provi.sianc: must rlo exactly all th a t i s nece ssary in 
order to enable them to exercise the power ~ iven by the provic;ion . 
The reas on for this rule is the likelihood of abnse that the 
power itself ~ ives as wel l a-, tile harrlship it c .,1,s es to the 
expcl]ed rartner. The court Play tl-ierefore decline to ~ ive effect 
to c1.n exnulsi.on of a ~artner even where there ic; a power und e r 
the partnership rleerl to ex!)cl, i.f t:, e expe1Je1 partner is ah le 
to establi c; h that his co-p:irtner c: h=:1.ve in fact used the power 
to nrlv~nce some privnte interests or selfi.c;h motives , unconnecterl 
with the interests of the firm as c; uch. 
i.s a breach of t11e ~eneral c;t,nrlarrls of honourable conriuct 
•vhich r, houl 'l e'<i ,;, t amon<?: partners :rnrl is destructi.ve of the 
r::utuaJ confirlcnce w~ich is a ch:1racterjstic f Pol. t11re of a 
t h
. (1) 
p.:.. r n e rc; 1.p. Thus the more gen er:,l the terr!'S of the 
expel t,f,e less li.' 'e]y t'1e expellerl r1 a rtner wil l be in 
tc1.sk of estahlish in Q; to the court's SP1.tisf ,. cti.on t 11,t the p.::trtne r s 
have ,buscd t.hei r po•ver . T111t eve n i.n .such circumstances the 
( 1 ) See nlisset v T)aniel (1 850 ) !!are 1'1~, fiR ·~. rL 1n22; 
Wood v ' ':oocl (1871) L . 1. gr.:'< 100; Green v !!owel l (1010) 1 Ch. 1<J5; 
11ond v Hale (1<J F'1 ), 89 '\0: (T't 1) (:b'V) 101 affjrrnerl (1<'Fl) (PT~) 
<JO 'V . ' ! . ('1 '"') 1 l<J. 
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challen~e may prove successful. Por example in Plisset 
( ·1) 
v Daniel 
the partnership agreement provided for expulsion by the holrfers 
of two-thirrl s of the shRres in an unincorpor a tecl companv of n ny 
pnrtner hy ";ivin~ ~im notice in writin~ unrler their h a nrls of such 
expuls ion in the folJorning; form: 
"'"e rio he,el-i:v ,:,;ive - vou notice th at you are herebv 
expe 11 erl from the pr1 rtner d1. i p of John t<'reeman and 
Conper Company. 
",'j tness our han4s this ...• rl a y of If 
The cl a n s e ,Ji_rl not reriuire V i e partners to sta te their reason c; 
for the exnu]si on nor rfi rl it c;tipul :1te an,v reriuire me nts bv ·•:r1 y 
of mee ti'1"; of, or deliberation .'.l.mo n g , t he ;1artners before tlie 
notice w.,s se rved. The partners in f a ct arlvqnced no reaso n s ~nrl 
merelv c;erved the notice in the prescribed form. 
action brou~ht h:v the expelled partner, however, he was able 
to show tliat t hev wi.sherl to get riri of him, not for the goo:1 of 
the firm, hut because he o pposed the appointment of the son of one 
of the partners as co-man a,ger with his father and th a t the f a ther 
had then f r-t eed the other pnrtners with the altern tive s that 
eit he r he or t he partner ·vho ohiecterl to the arrangement mtist i;o . 
Therefore, the other pa rtners signci the notice of expulsion 
lw t hefore servin,:,; it, they inriuced the pnrtner to si,gn a ccounts, 
in orrler th:it he would be bounri b,v them a fter he was expelled, 
while conceal in~ from him at th :,t st :,ge their intention to ex-.,el 
him. 'T'he notjce of expulsion was helrl void anri the p,:1rtner 
re ~ torerl to ~ is ri ~h ts a~ n partner nf the firm. 
on 
\n exar.rnle of the strict construction that the courts put 
3.n exrulsion clause is shown h:v the case of Tfond v !Tale~
2
) 
The plaintiffs an~ the defendants were all members of a partnership 
~overnerl bv a pRrtnerc;hip agreement w~ ich provi~ert that if certain 
conditions were estahl ic;hcrJ 11 t 1 e ot 11er nartner.s may by notice 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(18~)) 
Supra. 
rrare 49'.1, G8 -;: • ·~ . 10~2 
'.,ee also Re ,\ ';olicitors \rbitr ,1.tion [1'W '2..J 1 \11 :O: . ll. 772 
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in •.vritin~ ex]"'e] the partner :ic; in def,.,ult'. The three rlefenrl,.,t5 
nnrrorterl to exnel the t·vo r1air,ti ffs from tJ.e pnrtnership 
nl'rSt1'1nt to this clause anrl tlie r,uestion of L1w for tJ.e C'o11rt to 
rleter'line •vqs '1.'het1er the p.,rt.ncrshi p a0;reement r,;ive the 
rlefenrl~~ts the power to exnel the nlaintiffc;. Street .T. hel'! 
tliat, unon itc; true construction, tr>e C'C:'11lc;inn cli:l"'e 0nlv 
cnntempl:1ted the exnul~ion of nne p,rtncr ½,v the joint ~et.inn 
of ql] the other partner,. Therefore, it irl not exnresc;ly 
cover t1,c ex1;u l c; ion of t,vo p.:irt ners by the renia i. n in~ three. 
3trcet .J'-:; iccision 1rc1s .:i.ffirmecl on .:i;,pea]. (  1 ) 
2. :-Zi.~ht to be '.>eard before expu]sion 
The ri~ht of a partner to he henrrl, in e~plan,tion or 
j us t i f i c n t ion o f  h i. s c on rl u c t •.1: i l. l ~1 e re wl u '.1 on t h c t er r1 s  o f t i., e 
clat1se conferrjng the pov•er of expulsion. The early ~ngJi~h 
(2) (")) (1) cac;ec; of ·:00·:l. v '.'oor~, Ste·1·c1rt v Gladstone, -' n y rr an11 arne c; v 011n ~ 
may be cited as -:;urportin~ n ~encr'11 rroposition t~nt a ~:1rtner 
mus t al·.~·ay, he afforrled c1 fu11 op;1ortnnit,v of e-xnJaining his 
conduct before i,r i., exnelerl. '!o·.rever, Sd•v:1rrl.c; ,J. in '.'i]',i0 v ".'ilkie 
( 5) (:'>Jo. 2) marle a rJjstincti.on bet•yecn t·,·o possible types of cxpul-i.on 
c1'111s e s ; tl'nt ·,·1,ere :1. rn·•·cr is z-ivcn to expel a -;->'2rtner i11 rec:p 0ct 
0f n1ic;conrJuct •.1:1~ic11 ie:; the ~ro11n:l of expnlsion, o.nd that where tl1e 
ro·ver of expulc;ion ic: ";iver. in re-:;pect nf r.;ome spcci fie nnrned act 
o r conrJ11ct, a-; for example in thir.; c:1.r.;e. Tn t1°'e first ;:;iti"'ltion 
""d ·uc1rrlc; .J. held th1t tl-1c po,•:er coulrl not be exerciserl until 
notice ~~  been given tc t~e offenrlin~ p'1rtner of the particul, r 
act or miscon-luct wj_th •1·hich he is accused, ani he 1rl-"' harJ a n 
opportuni tv of :neetin;:; i. t. Sucl1 a ro·.ver must alwayc; be exercised 
(1) Supro. 
('.2) (1R71) L .... <) r.x. 100 
(:")) (1878) 10 Ch. D . G~6 
(1-) [18087 1 C!i 411 
( :i) ·;u:>ra 
-
bona firle nnd for the purpose for ~hich it was intended, anrl 
not for Uie purpose onlv of obt::iini11~ some c1rlv«nt:l~e over tlie 
expelled partner. ITo•,·ever, in the seconrl situri.tion the only 
r:uestion mu<::t he w'1€'t11€'r or not th~ <::pecj fie :i.ct which bv t!,e 
controct of t}-P ruT'tiec:: has b0. en r·nrle the c;,;ro11nrl of expulsion 
as been committerl. Erlwardc; J. found for the expelling r,:irtne r 5 
i.n t ', ic:: c,s c, hoLli.nr.- that t 1,e provision ·vas contrnctua]l:v 
hi.P1iP~ nn all the partners. 
\]so in ~np:lanrl tlie r 11 le crin no lonrrer be exprec;sed in 
t~e terms of ~cner2litv express ed in the earljcr cases. In 
r..reen v Uo•,,e11 (
1
) a cln11se in the -partnership ar-;reement rrovirJerl 
that a pnrtner who was guilty of a flagr~nt hreach of his rlutie 
mi ~ht,be expelled by his co-partners subject to a ri~ht of 
appeal to the arbitrator named in the partnership a':;reement. 
!Iis co- partners in ~ood faith served on hjr., notice that he was 
ex::iel Jed without :;ivjng i,im an opporh1nity to explain the conduct 
to "-' '1 ich except i_on had be en tnken. It •ms he l cl by the Court of 
69. 
Appeal that this was a Villi.cl notice of expulsion. Cozen - Tiarrly ~l.'1. (~) 
expl;\ i nerl the s i tu;:i t ion as fo J lo,rs: 
"It seems to me the fair reaciin; of this clause ••• is 
thj<::: The p l aintiff , one of the two partners, bcljeves 
a nrj asserts that there has he c n a hreach entitling him 
to cietermine · tl1e- partner .c:hip. lfe rri.ves notice of that, 
hut he -loes not i.n an:v Wi'\V act in a jurlicL:d ch;,racter. 
\ll he does is to start the rroceerlings , leavin~ it 
o ~en to the rlefenrlant in the action , the present 
,nrellc1rit , to ,'lnreal to the rloll'esti.c tril111nal w'.-li.ch the 
partiec:: have a-reed uron, n;,mel:v, the arbitr;,tor, to 
rlecide wl-iet}1cr a c;,se i.as i.appcnerl •vhi.ch justifies the 
~xpulsi.on. Tf t11;:i t i s not sufficie nt, thPn hv tl-ie 
orrlin ·,rv rrocerln re s of the Courts of jus tice the Court 
has to dec ide that C]Uestion, There 11.as been a trial 
here , a number of ,.,itne <::s es have been cxamjned ,and the 
Jenrnerl Jurl~e has founci without hesitation that there 
was a fla~rnnt breach of the ciefenrlnnt's rluty as a 
p, rtner justifying undoubtecily, apart from the form of 
the notice, the expul s ion. Is there any line of 
a uthorities,,,binrlin~ nc; tn holrl th,t tl-ie notice ic; 
( 1) D010] 1 Ch 1()5 
(2) ibid p. ~OR 
-
~lto~ether bad and t~at all proceedin~s 
thereunrl er must be disregarrJed becati.c::e no 
opportunity w;:i.s ~iven to the defenr!ants to 
explain or bec ,rnc:;e the notice did not more 
carefully c:;peci fv the ;;rounds of complaint?" 
The ~1<1ster of ti,e '<ollc:; was not aw:1re of there 1-:>eing: such an 
authority. 
It must he note -l !,owever t1, ;:it the prorosjtion stated in 
these two cases rloes not absolve t~e partners •vho Are exerci s ing 
the po~er of exnulsion from ~ivin~ the nffendin~ pnrtner notice 
of t~e alle~ntions made a~ainst him and a fair opportunity of a 
70. 
!1e::i.rin ;; in every case. If t',e nartners theriselves are placed in the 
poc;ition of t~e 11 tribu11a)" aij11dic a ti,-,g upon t..,eir co-n;;irtners' 
conrluct themse) vec;, t],e ruJ e in the older Eng) ish cases wi.J 1 be 
applied and t 1,e exrel]in~ partners, in common with other trihunal s 
adjurticgtinz upon such isc;ues(l) will be required to observe in 
relation to the offenrling partner these elements of the doctrine 
of natural ju s tice. nut •\•here the arljurlication is p]aceri in the 
hanrls of another tribunal and not in the hands of the partnerc:: 
them~elves, then the service of notice of expulsion by the 
p~rtners, without affor rUn :,: tl.e opporti,nity for a he:iri.nr,, rloes 
not offend a~nin s t natural justice because nn exercise of jurlicial 
power jc; involverl. All t 11e pc1rtners have -ione, bv t)1eir n0tice, 
is to rnise an is s ue, which, if the expelled partner so iesires 
may be arljudic8terl unon hy the nrhitrator. !lo ·vever, this vic·v of 
t.l1e l ,,w apnc ·1rs at fir<;t glc1nce to run contra to certc1in cleci .c:ions 
of the 7 n!.!:l i ·c: h courts - na•1cl:v Carmj chael v :~v,nc:; 
( 2) 
and 
(h) c:-n 
C1ifford v Timnis - Tri~gjns ::wrl Ketcher would certainly t;1ke 
t' iis view. TJowevcr, a close examination of these cases reveals 
that t~ey ~re not conc e rned with expul<::ion , hut with a 
(1) :-ice Lahouchere v 'l'harncliffe (187:J) 1, Ch I) '34f>; T)' \rcy v ,\rl::lmson 
(1°n) ~9 T.T.. '. L 1 r· 7; \nrlrews v ''itc" e 11 L1()():=iJ ,\.r,, 78 
( ~) [1904] 1 c11 ,rnr 
( h) ( 1908) 98 LT r,4 
("q Tli n·n·in <:: <> fi'letcl1cr 11 The L,w of r artnrrc;hi:-, in \ustr ·1li,,? ~ew 
'7.p~l,wl" (,rrl P.rlitinn 1°7;;). p . 1rR 
-
rlissolution of the partnershjp conse<1uent upon the partner's 
conrlnct, a rlic;tinctjon that has b0cn previous]v noterl. (l) 
( ')) 
',:dwardc; J. in '1'il\:ie v '\'ill:-ie ('fo. ~) anrl the e:i.r]v 
":n-i; lic;h cr1ses(
3
) cler1.rly ec::tablish that jn exercisin; n po·ver 
to cxrel a rnrtr.er , !,jc:; co-partners must -'..'let in e;oorl fait 1, 
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ot 1,erwi s e t1,.,E' ,1urrorterl exm1lsion rnr1v he helrl voirl ::iw-! t'1e T1artner 
re s torerl to hie:; ri ~'1tc:: in the pRrtnershjp. i ince the partners are 
bott:-irl to exhjhit to e:icli other perfect !!corl f.,jt,h jn the cowh'ct 
o f t t, e a f f R i r c:, o f t he r c1 r t n er c:: 11 i 'T) , t 1' e .s , r.w .s t n. n d ::i r rl o f c on d u c t i .c:, 
r1e n,.qr.derl •vhpre t'·ev are act.in"' unrler a powe r to rlissolve 
t' 1e )"lart,.,crs}1ir a s it rloes unrler a nower to expel. 
Since Rn invaljrl notice of exnulsion of a partner is of 
no effect, it hns been he)rl in "lew 7.ealand hy Ji'.d·varrls ,J. in 
Connel] v Slack( 4 ) and in ~ni;l anrl 
( 5) 
hy lfoorl v ' food that the par tner 
against whom the purporterl expulsion was directed may not recover 
da111a:~es for wrong: fuJ rlismissal. 'T'he logic of tt,is ru]e seems 
to rest ttpon tlie vie,v tliat no one c ,;1n suffer damar;es from a 
notice of expulsion from a partnership •. •hich doe~ not in fr1ct 
ac', ieve •,•hat it purports to rlo namely, exreJ liim. It is c::tibmi.tted 
ho•vever th:it n purtner riay suffer d f1 1~an:e as a re s ult of tlie inval irl 
notic e , if for example it has been m~de ruhlic . The cia ;r. a ,<:,e 
su ffererl in most cases ·,rnulrl, he to the reput , tion of tl,e wro n r- fully 
e'<pcJlecl ;1nrtner 1 t',is of conrc::e woulrl in most CFJSes be effnced hy 
" i s hein n: re -=dorerl to the ;:n rtnersbip. :Iowever , there seems to 
he no lo iric , l rew:::on , .. i,:V ;;i court conlrl not gr;int dnma~es if tJ,e ac t 
of exnel lin "'; the p:irtner wris -l one •!lr1.liciousl,· or without 
( 1) 
( '.2 ) 
(:,;) 
( 1 ) 
( ') ) 
Su::ira [' . ,s 
Surra 
~lisset v ')rin icl s (1R!'1,) 1n '.lnrc 4,1')~, 1\'00('1 v '"oorl (1874) 1 . . • g 
!,:x 100; )tewart v GL.1rlstone (1878) 10 (11. 1) h'~!; '7usse)l v '1uc::sel 1 
( 1 P80) 11 ~h . n. 171; 1\,1:rnes v Yo11n r·.s [1P.08] 1 Ch 111 
(1N')0) ~q ~! . 7, .f. r r n 
'.31 :prr1 
-
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/ 1 1 ', 0 i'r(' 'l -', t ,·-,i nc; t t 1, e rnrtn 0 r c:; :-, cr :: o :in l J ,. o r ::l"' : i ns t th 2 "~rn. 
( C) ) 
' "" 
1 
,"' h01'.:' n ...,,c vi01 1-; lv : t ;:it cd, ·,,·'1erc t li c :ia rtnc r ,; :, i p 
c1 r h itr n t o r if :-11 c' 1 i s 
r r o vi d e d f nr j~ t ~c ~~ree r ent. 1'' : " r :i ~: l . t O f .:l r .:1 r t n f' r t O 
ju "' tice w~ ere the p a rtner i s e~pelled. 
i n t~e practic ~ l conse q uence s of t J, e exerci <::: e of t ~ e t ~ o 
ro"·e r s '" OU 1 ,i a 1 , o seeIT' to c:; 11 :r,_;est t ',a t t 1i e rule s o-f '"' :1tur;, 1 
ju s tice s l1011l:i lJe o bse rv0rJ _ ··,,•e re tl'e exerci s e 0f t'·,e p o·.1·er 
involve rl r e c;; ult c:; in a "rl:iss o luti o n" to t h e c; .'l:-' e extent ac:; t', ey 
ar:, l y t o ...1n " e·cpu1 s ion". 
C0 7,eno- 1 f;, r ·1v, ' "< i :-. "rec n v : 'o·•!el1 (') 
t 1- e ri r o c Pe rl i r ,..-:; '' l e -: ,., i n ,,. i t 1: :c t o t '· e o ff en d i n ~ ;-- , rt n er t 0 
c', , 11 ,-,nge t 1, eir rJe ci c; i ori , i f h e ·." i ::;~ es , in t'' P Col'rt. 
- n o:11 fnr t h e :1p:1lic :, tion n f t h e r1' 1 e -c: o f r , h 1 r -:i ] ,iu s tice to t'1e ir 
::c c t ions. F11rtl'i0r s uriryort " s ."· i ven to tbe ,Ji s t i net ion •yh i eh 
is -:; 011 •r ht. to 1, e n1::,..··le, •,:hen tJ,e c .,c:e of ;i n ower to cxnel in t 1, e 
e vent nf ·1 :--,rt r.2 r fn.i]intc or o mittin i.:; t0 -!i -:: c 1n r'!'e rnrt of 'iis 
(1) .3ec s .1~ l'artnership \et 1 '1/) R 
( ~ ~ c..;u pr" p • :,; 8 
(3 . C1010.:J 1 Ch. '1-0!'1, ~05 
-
( 1 ) 
rJ,,ti.es is concerned. Jn -: 'Tii t'1 v ,·ules the court helrl 
t',at a nower to ev:nel a rie 1rber, for f,ili.n'l'. to enter in the 
!->ooks of ,cco11nts of t'1e :,,rtncrship the rnonie.s received hv 
> in on he a] f of t ' c firTP, could only he exerci ..., ecl if the 
nmissi.on was nelih0.rnte. 'lo:•·ever, no st:c~ rule exi::;t.s ·v'iere the 
snn'e conduct .iu c, ti fies a dissol11ti on i.n terms c f the partncrc::hip 
<'t,'~reernent, for .:il] tl rn t is rcruircd unrler s38(rl) of the 
-:-'a rtner·...:hip .'.et 1"1)R i.s t'.e situ;-ition: 
,, .. .,,c-rc ~ ;)·1rtner, ot.'. ' E'r t:i n n the p:irtner suin!s 
" i.lf1,llv nr -:,ersistently co~mits a hre ·1ch of 
t h e partnershi.p a ,;reement, or ot',cr1.-jse <so 
c0n-lucts himself in rn;:itter':3 rel .,ti_n-~· to the 
~ ~rtnership business thnt it is not reasonahlv 
practicable for the ot'ier partner or p;-irtners 
to c ::irrv on tl-ie business in partners!,ip with 
him". ( the emnhas i.s has be en added). 
Hence jn such a case al 1 that is neces .,rnry is for the partners 
to satisfy the court that it is impossible for them to have that 
confidence in tl-ie delinquent p , rtner which each ha .s a ri~ht to 
expect . Natura] 1 y enou •;h tlie 1 osc; of con firlence cannot be causeri 
½v t~e partners' see!t in~ to take arlvnntag e of the provision.(
2
) 
In hoth a companv ~nn a partners'iip the expelled person 
is serious]y 'ianr:licapped by tbe courts' general reluctance to 
look he:vonrl t 11e ele --1 ent l-i ;:1r ·r;iin between the parties as evidenced 
' iv the rnemor 1nrl111T1 a nrl c1rticles of ac::soci.'1tion or the 
p ::irtner.shir a p;reenient, rerr ·~rrlless of the l:..irdshjp cnu ,c;er:l. 
Tf ncr ~ ons come to ~et' er to form R lc;nl relationship for 
comrr.ercL.ll purposes, and enter into .:1 contr.ict it seems reasonahle 
to assume tl1at tLe parties shoulri have the bar~ain enforced against 
them . .\s ~ns hecome ohviouc:: t'irou "' hout this djscussion the 
meanin·~ of nc1tur.1l .i11stice cannot he cieterminerl preci.se1y from 
;my on~ dC'cision :1nu it. ic:: ;i cp1estion to be rletermi.necl hy the 
(1) (1R5~) 9 1are 55G supra 
('2) '-iee Re Yenicl .ie Tobacco Co. Ltrl. (10FJ 2 Ch 1Pf, 4~0 
7J. 
-
facts of each c3se whether the courts in the interests of 
fairness must supplement the written ar-;reement . nut i.t is 
<;ubrnitted that the courts ,;:;houlrl 11lwavs start with the 
as'31..1mnti.on th::i.t the rule<, of n::itur,l ju">ti.ce i'lpplv to hoth a 
comnany :1 n d a partne r"> hip where c1 rne·•1ber or partner ic: beinz 
expelled. JTo,vevcr, t 11e proyier construction of the a;:?;reement 
between the parties ma:v in fr1.ct cxc]urle the rule s , hut t!1e 
courts should be ver:v c:low to arlorit such a construction. 
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